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Three Essays On Tax Salience:
Market Salience and Political Salience
DAVID GAMAGE* & DARIEN SHANSKE**
I.

INTRODUCTION

Should the United States introduce a value added tax? How should
we manage budget deficits? Should we abolish the alternative minimum tax? Why does the United States conduct most of its socialwelfare policy through tax expenditures? Should we automate and
simplify income tax filing? Tax salience is key to these and other important debates.
The behavioral economics revolution has finally reached the study

of taxation.1 Tax salience refers to how the presentation of tax prices
affects taxpayer behavior. 2 In other words, tax salience measures how
taxpayer behavior departs from key assumptions of neoclassical economic theory.

In a sense, scholars and policymakers have debated questions about
tax salience for centuries.3 Naive notions about tax salience have ex* Assistant Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley (Boalt Hall).
As this Article goes to press, Gamage is on teaching leave while serving as Special
Counsel and Senior Stanley S. Surrey Fellow to the Treasury, Office of Tax Policy. This
Article was almost entirely written prior to the start of Gamage's Treasury position;
nothing discussed herein reflects the views of the Treasury, the Obama administration, or
anyone other than Gamage and Shanske.
** Associate Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of Law.
Many thanks to Ty Alper, Ellen Aprill, Michelle Anderson, Steve Bank, Joe Bankman,
Ilan Benshalom, Eric Biber, Josh Blank, Neil Buchanan, Lee Anne Fennell, Heather Field,
Victor Fleischer, Brian Galle, Mark Gergen, David Hasen, Damon Jones, Kinch Hoekstra,
Amy Kapczynski, Sarah Lawsky, Ethan Leib, Shannon McCormack, Susie Morse, Melissa
Murray, Miranda Perry-Fleischer, Katherine Pratt, Jim Repetti, Deborah Schenk, Jason
Schultz, Ted Seto, Kirk Stark, Nancy Staudt, Jeff Strnad, Molly S. Van Houweling, Larry
Zelenak, Eric Zolt, and the participants at the Berkeley Law Junior Working Ideas Group,
the Boulder Roundtable on Tax and Distributive Justice, the Law and Society Association
Annual Conference, the Loyola-LA Tax Policy Colloquium, the National Tax Association
Annual Conference, the Northern California Tax Roundtable, and the UCLA Tax Policy
Colloquium. We would also like to thank the staff of the Tax Law Review for careful and
thoughtful editing.
1 See, e.g., Behavioral Public Finance 173-258 (Edward J. McCaffery & Joel Slemrod
eds., 2006).
2 We offer more precise definitions in text accompanying notes 14-17.
3 See, e.g., John Stuart Mill, Principles of Political Economy 237 (Jonathan Riley ed.,
Oxford Univ. Press 2008) (1848) ("Perhaps...the money which he [the taxpayer] is required to pay directly out of his pocket is the only taxation which he is quite sure that he
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erted a powerful force on tax policy. Many reforms that would improve the efficiency of taxation have been opposed because of
concerns about a "less visible tax system" or "fiscal illusion."'4 Yet
despite the ardent political rhetoric over tax salience, social science
has only just begun to produce concrete results on the behavioral economics of tax perception. There is a wide disparity between political
rhetoric and the findings of the empirical literature.
This Article contains three essays on tax salience. The essays are
distinct in both style and analytic approach, and each essay presents a
separate argument. We collect the essays in a single Article because
each of the essays builds on the prior, such that the whole of the collected Article is more than the sum of its three parts.
Our first essay-in Part II of this Article-assesses the empirical
literature on both market salience and political salience. Market salience refers to how tax presentation affects market decisions and economic activity; Deborah Schenk labels this phenomenon "economic
salience."'5 Political salience refers to how tax presentation affects
voting behavior and political outcomes. We argue that these two
dimensions of tax salience should be thought of as separate concepts;
tax design techniques that reduce market salience may increase political salience, and vice versa. We further conclude that the empirical
literature does not support the strong claims about either form of tax
salience that frequently are made with respect to real-world policy.
Nevertheless, we disagree with scholars who suggest ignoring tax
salience until the empirical literatures are more advanced. 6 We stress
pays at all. If all taxes were direct, taxation would be much more perceived than at present; and there would be a security which now there is not, for economy in the public
expenditure."); see also Susanne Lohmann & Deborah M. Weiss, Hidden Taxes and Representative Government: The Political Economy of the Ramsey Rule, 30 Pub. Fin. Rev.
579 (2002); Robert Sausgruber & Jean-Robert Tyran, Testing the Mill Hypothesis of Fiscal
Illusion, 122 Pub. Choice 39 (2005). Or, as put recently and colorfully by Grover Norquist:
"Then we get to the issue of visibility, which I think is the key thing here. We want people
to be aware of what they're paying and how much it costs. The idea that one of the benefits [of a reform proposal, the ReadyReturn] is to reduce the psychic costs of tax filing
reminds me of the argument for the guillotine, which was that it was more humane. It also
meant that it would be used more frequently." Grover Norquist, President, Americans for
Tax Reform, Testimony Before the President's Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform
(May 17, 2005), available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/taxreformpanellmeetings/docs/
transcript_05172005.doc.
4 Amy Finkelstein, EZ-Tax: Tax Salience and Tax Rates, 124 Q.J. Econ. 969, 970 (2009).
5 Deborah H. Schenk, Exploiting the Salience Bias in Designing Taxes, 28 Yale J. on
Reg. 253, 272-73 (2011) (similarly distinguishing economic salience from political salience).
6 See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Second-Order Rationality, in Behavioral Public Finance
355, 358 (arguing that "the [behavioral finance] studies' heavy reliance on decisions college
students made in laboratory conditions makes it hard to generate any theory about which
of these biases operate . . .in well-defined social contexts"). Note the most important
recent empirical studies of tax salience are not based on laboratory results. See generally
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the need to improve policymakers' understandings in order to combat
the pernicious influence that nafve notions about tax salience currently exert over fiscal politics. And, as the empirical and theoretical
literatures continue to develop, we expect these literatures to yield
new tools with the potential for greatly improving tax efficiency.
Our second essay-in Part III of this Article-evaluates the normative implications of market salience. We argue for a general presumption in favor of reducing market salience. Our assessment contrasts
with the conclusions of much of the recent literature. Although the
benefits of reducing market salience are well understood, it is frequently argued that these benefits may be overwhelmed by concerns
related to: (1) distortionary income effects, (2) externalities, and (3)
distribution. We conclude that the recent literature has overstated all
three of these concerns.
We first argue that the nature of how taxpayers learn from experience implies that the advantages of reducing market salience usually7
should overpower any harm caused by distortionary income effects.
We then explain how most of the concerns related to externalities and
distribution can be resolved by the strategy of offsetting tax-rate adjustments. Overall, with some noted exceptions, we hold that it is generally desirable to decrease the market salience of taxation. As
theorists develop new tools for exploiting market salience, we urge
policymakers to use these tools to improve the efficiency of revenue
collection.
Our third essay-in Part IV of this Article-evaluates the normative implications of political salience. We dispute the common assumption that it is wrong for governments to decrease the political
salience of taxation. 8 The essence of our argument is that increasing
the political salience of taxation is akin to providing voters with false
or arbitrary information about tax costs. Neither the fields of philosophy nor of voter psychology are sufficiently developed to guide us as
to what information voters ought to focus on when assessing realworld fiscal policies. Democratic values thus provide no indication as
to whether political salience should be made higher or lower.
Raj Chetty, Adam Looney & Kory Kroft, Salience and Taxation: Theory and Evidence, 99
Am. Econ. Rev. 1145 (2009); Finkelstein, note 4.
7 We more fully explain the concept of "distortionary income effects" (and our argument related thereto) in Section III.B.
B Schenk, note 5, at 255 ("Some work has been done to untangle the cognitive biases
that result in less attention being paid to low-salience taxes. Normative argument with
respect to such taxes, however, is quite limited; there is almost a universal assumption that
increased salience is preferred and that the intentional use of low-salience taxes by the
government is undesirable. This distaste is manifested in the term often used to describe
such taxes: 'hidden taxes."').
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To foreshadow our argument, voters' assessments of tax costs are
primarily determined by starting with some notion of pretax resources
(for example, gross income) and then subtracting taxes paid. Yet all
existing measurements for pretax resources depend on the operation
of government in its current form, which in turn depends on tax payments. No philosophical theory is sufficiently well developed to measure with the needed precision how pretax resources would differ
without government (that is, in the state of nature). Lacking such a
theory, we cannot assess the normative implications of altering how
voters understand pretax resource measurements. The problem is
then further confounded by uncertainty regarding the political salience of government spending and by the apparent shallowness and
malleability of voters' expressed preferences about fiscal policy.
Again, democratic values provide no support for either increasing or
decreasing political salience. We thus argue against the numerous
scholars and policymakers who oppose reforms that would improve
tax efficiency because these reforms might reduce political salience.
Together, our three essays argue for improving policymakers' understanding of tax salience. The need is great. Many analysts predict
that the United States is charting a course toward a massive budget
crisis that could result in another Great Depression. 9 Meanwhile, coinciding with recent breakthroughs in the academic study of tax salience, the rapid spread of tax-filing software and related technology
promises many new opportunities for designing tax systems to exploit
tax salience. 10 We suspect that our best hopes for avoiding the looming fiscal catastrophe may be for: (1) policymakers to begin utilizing
new tools for reducing market salience and (2) for policymakers to
stop opposing existing tax reform proposals for fear of reducing political salience.
II.

UNDERSTANDING

THE MULTIPLE DIMENSIONS OF TAX SALIENCE

In this Part, our first essay, we assess the empirical literature on two
distinct forms of tax salience-which we label as market salience and
political salience. We argue that tax design techniques that reduce salience along one of these dimensions may increase salience along the
other dimension. We further conclude that the existing empirical find9 See, e.g., Alan J. Auerbach & William G. Gale, D6jA Vu All Over Again: On the
Dismal Prospects for the Federal Budget, 63 Nat'l Tax J. 543 (2010); Leonard E. Burman,
Countdown to Catastrophe, Milken Inst. Rev., 2d Quarter 2010, at 16; Joann M. Weiner,
Panelists Sketch a Plan to Avoid Fiscal Ruin, 119 Tax Notes 27 (Apr. 7, 2008).
10 See, e.g., Lawrence Zelenak, Essay, Complex Tax Legislation in the TurboTax Era, 1
Colum. J. Tax L. 91, 92 (2010) ("With few returns now prepared by hand, however, the
computational complexity constraint on the income tax rules applicable to large numbers
of taxpayers has virtually disappeared.").
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ings on both forms of tax salience are tentative. Despite the ardent
beliefs that many commentators express about tax salience, 1 we cannot currently predict with any confidence how tax-design techniques
affect tax salience within real-world environments. Yet, although we
caution against overenthusiastic speculation about how tax salience
operates in the real world, we do not agree that normative scholars
should ignore tax salience until better empirical results are available.
NaYve notions about tax salience already dramatically influence tax
policy debates. Improving policymakers' understanding of tax salience is thus necessary in order both to combat the pernicious influence of current naive notions about tax salience and hopefully to
guide the direction of future tax reforms as the literatures on tax salience continue to develop.
As we use the term, "tax salience" refers to the extent to which
taxpayers account for the costs imposed by taxation when the taxpayers make decisions or judgments. The concept of tax salience is thus
meant to abstract from taxpayers' values or preferences with respect
to taxation-from how the taxpayers might wish to account for tax
costs were they not subject to cognitive limitations. 12 Our concept of
tax salience would be meaningless in a world of complete information
in which taxpayers had unlimited time and resources and were not
subject to any cognitive biases. Thus, our concept of tax salience is
meant to capture any systematic differences between how taxpayers
would perceive the costs of taxation in this hypothetical world of perfect economic rationality and how taxpayers actually perceive the
13
costs of taxation in the real world.
11 For example, Milton Friedman has stated:

The value added tax is a very efficient tax. That's its virtue. And it's also its
vice because it makes the tax appear invisible and thus it's always tempting to
raise it.
I once examined the situation for all the European countries that had installed-instituted a value added tax and every single country that had instituted a value added tax subsequently raised the rate, and every one of the
countries, government spending went up sharply after they introduced a value
added tax.
Milton Friedman, Testimony Before the President's Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform 116 (Mar. 31, 2005), available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/taxreformpanel/meetings/meeting-03312005.html.
12For a broader discussion of the distinction between economic agents' observed actions
and their "normative preferences" or "actual interests," see John Beshears, James J. Choi,
David Laibson & Brigitte C. Madrian, How Are Preferences Revealed?, 92 J. Pub. Econ.
1787 (2008).
13The adjective "systematic" is emphasized so that taxpayer confusion is not thought to
be synonymous with tax salience unless the confusion leads taxpayers to consistently err in
the same direction. A tax instrument has low salience (on some dimension) when taxpayers consistently underestimate its tax price, or high salience when taxpayers consistently
overestimate its tax price; but a random mixture of some taxpayers underestimating and
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To use a simple example: If every taxpayer knew at all times that all
their retail purchases were subject to a 10% sales tax-and always
acted on that knowledge-then our concept of tax salience would be a
mere theoretical curiosity because actual taxpayers would not make
errors based on the presentation of the tax at the moment of any important decisions. So too, our concept of tax salience would be of
little interest if sometimes actual taxpayers believed they were paying
less than 10% in sales tax, and other times more than 10%, with the
two categories of errors counteracting so that taxpayers' average perceptions were roughly accurate. Tax salience is important because of
the common intuition, confirmed by some evidence, that taxpayers
consistently perceive themselves as paying less (or more) in taxes in
response to certain forms of tax presentation.
There are multiple dimensions to tax salience. Potentially, tax salience could operate differently with respect to every judgment or decision taxpayers make for which tax costs are relevant, such that each
tax-relevant decision could be viewed as a separate dimension of tax
salience. This Article focuses on two categories of tax-relevant decisions: tax salience with regard to market decision-making (for example, consumer purchasing) and tax salience with regard to politicaljudgment formation (for example, individual voting). We label the
first dimension as the "market salience" of taxation and the second
dimension as the "political salience" of taxation.
Literatures related to tax salience frequently use alternative terms
such as "fiscal illusion" or "hidden taxes."'1 4 We avoid both terms because they strike us as emotion laden and potentially misleading in the
intuitive responses they invoke. We instead refer to the "market salience" and "political salience" of taxation, as we consider these terms
to be both more neutral and more precise.
For both market salience and political salience, we intend the concept of tax salience to indicate whether taxpayers would make systemothers overestimating a tax price is not indicative of tax salience. See Wallace E. Oates,
On the Nature and Measurement of Fiscal Illusion: A Survey, in Taxation and Fiscal Federalism: Essays in Honour of Russell Mathews 65, 67 (Geoffrey Brennan, Bhajan Singh
Grewel & Peter D. Groenwegen eds., 1988) ("Imperfect information is not, however, synonymous with fiscal illusion. It is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for its existence. More specifically, fiscal illusion refers to systematic misperception of fiscal
parameters.").
14 See, e.g., Joseph M. Johnson, Commentary, Measuring Hidden Taxes, Cato Rev. Bus.
& Gov't (Mercatus Reports), Winter 2001, at 7; Edward A. Zelinsky, Unfunded Mandates,
Hidden Taxation, and the Tenth Amendment: On Public Choice, Public Interest, and Public Services, 46 Vand. L. Rev. 1355 (1993).
The terms "hidden taxes" and "fiscal illusion" are typically used to refer to what we label
as taxes with low political salience. Brian Galle, however, also uses the term "hidden
taxes" to refer to tax instruments that we label as having low market salience. Brian Galle,
Hidden Taxes, 87 Wash. U. L. Rev. 59, 62 (2009).
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atically different market or political judgments when faced with
equivalently sized tax liabilities depending on how the tax liabilities

are presented.15 Our definition for tax salience is therefore not meant
to include any changes to taxpayer behavior that result from shifting
tax burdens among different groups of taxpayers or from otherwise
increasing or decreasing the actual tax burden faced by any individual
taxpayer. If taxpayers make market and political judgments about

taxation solely based on their aggregate tax burdens and thus are not
impacted by the manner in which tax burdens are presented, then all
forms of taxation would be equally salient. This Article's analysis of
tax salience is concerned with the many ways in which the presentation of a taxpayer's aggregate tax burden has been argued to impact

the judgments made by the taxpayer.
We proceed in this Part by analyzing the existing empirical literatures on both the market salience and the political salience of taxation. We emphasize that these should be considered two distinct
dimensions of tax salience. Many tax design techniques that we expect to reduce market salience are likely to increase political salience,
and vice versa. 16 Again, although our discussion focuses exclusively
on market salience and political salience, there undoubtedly exist
other additional dimensions to tax salience. 17 Even tax design techniques that reduce both market salience and political salience may
I8
nonetheless increase tax salience along other dimensions.
15As our inquiry focuses on the presentation of tax prices, our concerns are distinct
from-and logically prior to-the related issues of tax-averse or tax-accepting preferences.
For further discussion of tax-averse and tax-accepting preferences-with a focus on distinguishing the concepts of tax-averse and tax-accepting preferences from the political salience hypothesis of tax-label aversion, see Subsection II.B.6.
16 See Section II.C.

17In general, any categorization schema for tax salience must necessarily be somewhat
artificial-lumping together some concepts that could be distinguished and excluding some
dimensions of tax salience that could be made part of the analysis. In particular, it is always possible to make a categorization schema more granular (thereby adding greater precision at the expense of simplicity) or less granular (thereby sacrificing exactness for
tractability). As this Part should make clear, we believe that lumping all forms of tax
salience into a single concept leads to analytical error that is not justified by the pursuit of
simplicity. We are less certain of whether our schema of distinguishing market salience and
political salience should be further subdivided. We suspect that additional precision may
be helpful for some research questions but may produce unnecessary complexity for
others.
18 Another dimension, which we only address in passing, is that of the salience of various taxes in deciding where to live. Property taxes, for example, might be more or less
salient depending on how they are presented; if, for example, one automatically pays property taxes along with a mortgage or not. See Marika Cabral & Caroline Hoxby, The Hated
Property Tax: Salience, Tax Rates, and Tax Revolts (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://www.stanford.edu/-mcabralfraxSalience.pdf. Note that the issues of presentation,
timing, indirection, and relation to benefits will all be relevant to the two types of salience
we discuss. The interplay of these modes of salience, however, may be different in the case
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Reviewing the Empirical Literature on Market Salience

The empirical literature on the market salience of taxation is relatively recent, with most of the important studies being less than a decade old. This literature has grown as a subfield of behavioral

economics and as an offshoot of a literature on consumer-purchasing
behavior largely developed within the marketing departments of busi-

ness schools. The vast majority of economic analyses of taxation continue to assume that taxpayers respond solely to after-tax prices-that
all taxes are fully market salient. 19 Yet a number of recent empirical
studies have concluded that taxpayers do not always fully factor the

price effects of taxation into their market decisions, thus making any
ignored (or partially ignored) tax instruments less market-salient.
Employing terminology developed by Jeffery Liebman and Richard

Zeckhauser, we divide the empirical literature on market salience into
two broad categories: "spotlighting" and "ironing. ' 20 When taxpayers can easily understand the aggregate price of engaging in a market
transaction, taxes should typically be fully market salient. Tax instruments generally should only have reduced market salience when tax

prices are complicated or obscured in some fashion, such that it becomes more difficult to calculate the aggregate price of engaging in a
market decision. The two categories of the empirical literature-spot-

lighting and ironing-examine two different hypotheses for how taxpayers may respond to obfuscated tax prices.

of deciding where to live. In particular, the question of the salience of property taxes is
bound up with the so-called Tiebout hypothesis, which posits, roughly, that competition
among jurisdictions produces efficiency in the production of local public goods. If this
hypothesis is correct, then, as Galle notes, lessening salience might lessen efficiency. Galle,
note 14, at 96-97. The Tiebout hypothesis, however, is controversial on many dimensions;
in particular, it may not be descriptive of many (any) actual decisions, and Tiebout sorting
may not be normatively desirable in any event. See, e.g., Darien Shanske, What the Original Property Tax Revolutionaries Wanted (It Is Not What You Might Think), Cal. J.Pol. &
Pol'y (2009), http://www.bepress.com/cjpp/voll/issl/18 (reviewing Isaac William Martin,
The Permanent Tax Revolt: How the Property Tax Transformed American Politics
(2008)). Note that one of us (Shanske) plans to return to the relationship between tax
salience and Tiebout sorting.
19 See Chetty et al., note 6, at 1145. ("A central assumption in public economics is that
agents optimize fully with respect to tax policies.").
20 Jeffrey B. Liebman & Richard J. Zeckhauser, Schmeduling 2 (Oct. 2004) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.hks.harvard.edu/jeffreyliebman/schmeduling.
pdf.
Although we use Liebman and Zeckhauser's terminology, we do not restrict ourselves to
using these terms in precisely the same manner as do Liebman and Zeckhauser. In particular, our use of the term "spotlighting" is broader.
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Spotlighting

The most developed hypothesis in the market salience literature
predicts spotlighting behavior. As Liebman and Zeckhauser define
the term, "spotlighting occurs when consumers respond to immediate
or local prices and ignore the full schedule that they face." ' 21 More
broadly, spotlighting involves taxpayers focusing only on certain components of an aggregate price and thereby underestimating the aggregate price. 22 Simply dividing an aggregate price into a tax price and a
pretax price, however, may not be enough to induce spotlighting. In
most of the empirical studies on spotlighting, an additional element
also comes into play-a separation of the tax assessment from the
market decision.
The seminal paper on the market salience of taxation-written by
Raj Chetty, Adam Looney, and Kory Kroft-examines spotlighting
with respect to sales and excise taxes. 23 Their paper includes two empirical studies showing that consumers do not always fully factor the
price effects of retail sales taxes into their purchasing decisions. It is
hard to overstate the importance of the Chetty, Looney, and Kroft
paper to the emerging literature on market salience; hence, it is worth
briefly discussing both of the studies reported therein.
Chetty, Looney, and Kroft's first study examined consumer decision-making in grocery stores. They convinced a Northern California
grocery to include sales tax information and post-tax prices on the tags
listing the prices for some goods displayed on the store's aisles, while
continuing the standard practice of displaying only pretax prices for
other goods. 24 The study found that consumers were significantly less
likely to purchase goods for which the tax information was posted,
even though later consumers at the same stores displayed accurate
knowledge about the sales tax when later surveyed. 25 Chetty, Looney,
and Kroft reasonably concluded that simple ignorance of the sales tax
was not the issue. Instead, the taxpayers appeared to simply not fac26
tor the price effects of the sales tax into their purchasing decisions.
In their second study, Chetty, Looney, and Kroft examined responses to alcohol excise taxes over time as opposed to sales taxes on
Id. at 3.
Spotlighting is related to the concept of "partitioned pricing" (or "reference pricing")
in the consumer behavior literature. For a review of the consumer behavior literature on
this concept, see Vicki G. Morwitz, Eric A. Greenleaf, Edith Shalev & Eric J. Johnson, The
Price Does Not Include Additional Taxes, Fees, and Surcharges: A Review of Research on
Partitioned Pricing (Feb. 26, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id= 350004.
23 Chetty et al., note 6.
24 Id. at 1146-47.
25 Id. at 1150-58, 1165-66.
21
22

26 Id.
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alcohol, where the former taxes are incorporated into the prices for
alcohol displayed on the aisles, but the latter taxes are only added in
at the register. Consistent with the grocery store experiment, they
found significantly higher elasticities for the alcohol excise taxes than
for the sales taxes.2 7 In both studies, Chetty, Looney, and Kroft found
that consumers were more responsive to taxes that were incorporated
into the prices posted in the aisles than to the taxes that were not
added until the register. 28 The consumers appeared to spotlight on
the prices posted in the aisles, thus (at least partially) ignoring the
nonposted prices of the sales taxes.
Several other papers have reported results consistent with Chetty,
Looney, and Kroft's. 29 Richard Ott and David Andrus found that
consumers do not fully take account of vehicle personal property
taxes when making automobile purchasing decisions. 30 And Kelly
Gallagher and Erich Muehlegger report that sales-tax waivers given at
the time of purchase have a much larger effect on hybrid-vehicle
purchases than do similarly sized income tax credits. 3 1 Like retail
sales taxes, vehicle personal property taxes and income tax credits are
not assessed until after purchasing decisions are made, thus apparently making their price implications less market salient.

Id. at 1158-66.
Id. at 1175.
29 See Liebman & Zeckhauser, note 20 at 6-13, 39-43 (discussing both the broader literature on spotlighting in the tax context and their own empirical study examining spotlighting by food stamp recipients). The empirical literature on spotlighting in the tax context is
sparse, as is the entire empirical literature on the market salience of taxation. We cite in
this paper all of the studies on the market salience of taxation of which we are aware. The
conclusions of these tax-focused studies correspond with similar findings in the much larger
non-tax-focused consumer behavior literature. For instance, E-bay shoppers have been
shown to be less sensitive to shipping costs than to bidding prices. Tanjim Hossain & John
Morgan,. . Plus Shipping and Handling: Revenue (Non) Equivalence in Field Experiments on eBay, Advances Econ. Analysis & Pol'y 1 (2006) http://www.bepress.com/bejeap/
advances/vol6/iss2/art3/. For general reviews of the relevant studies in the consumer behavior literature, see Xavier Gabaix & David Laibson, Shrouded Attributes, Consumer
Myopia, and Information Suppression in Competitive Markets, 121 Q.J. Econ. 505 (2006);
Hyeong Min Kim & Luke Kachersky, Dimensions of Price Salience: A Conceptual Framework for Perceptions Of Multi-Dimensional Prices, 15 J. Product & Brand Mgmt. 139, 13940 (2006); Morwitz et al., note 22.
30 Richard L. Ott & David M. Andrus, The Effect of Personal Property Taxes on Consumer Vehicle-Purchasing Decisions: A Partitioned Price/Mental Accounting Theory
Analysis, 28 Pub. Fin. Rev. 134, 144-45 (2000). Interestingly, Ott and Andrus' respondents
opined that the vehicle personal property taxes were "too high." Id. at 150. This result
thus supports our argument about the difference between market salience and political
salience with respect to excise taxes. See Section II.C.
31 Kelly Sims Gallagher & Erich Muehlegger, Giving Green to Get Green? Incentives
and Consumer Adoption of Hybrid Vehicle Technology, 61 J. Envtl. Econ. & Mgmt. 1, 9
(2011). But see Galle, note 14, at 76-77 (critiquing Gallagher and Muehlegger's study).
27
28
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In another related study, Amy Finkelstein examined how driving
behavior reacts to the introduction of electronic toll collection. 32 She
found that the elasticity of driving with respect to toll rates (the degree to which increasing toll rates leads to decreased driving) declined
significantly with the introduction of electronic toll collection. 33 Finkelstein's study suggests that drivers spotlight on toll amounts that are
actually handed over while driving, as compared to toll amounts paid
34
separately through electronic toll collection.
Extrapolating across the studies discussed above, the evidence appears to suggest that taxpayers often discount taxes that are not assessed until after a market decision has been made. In other words,
taxpayers appear to spotlight on the prices charged (or displayed) at
the time of market decision-making.
Although it is easiest to understand how spotlighting might reduce
tax salience with respect to consumer purchasing decisions, Jacob Nussim has argued that spotlighting might also affect labor-supply decisions. 35 If workers make job choices based primarily on posted pretax
salary information, rather than on their aggregate post-tax salaries,
then even the income tax may have low-market-salience. 36 Theoretically, almost any tax instrument could be constructed to induce spotlighting by delaying tax assessment until some time period after the
relevant market decisions.
Nussim's argument that spotlighting also might affect labor-supply
decisions is supported by two laboratory experiments. 37 First, Tomer
Blumkin, Bradley Ruffle, and Yosef Ganun conducted an experiment
comparing a wage tax (assessed when income is earned) to an other38
wise-equivalent consumption tax (assessed when income is spent).
32 Finkelstein, note 4.
33 Id. at 986-90.

34 Electronic toll collection does not strictly involve spotlighting, as there is no base
price to toll collection, only a tax price. As in the other spotlighting studies, however,
electronic toll collection creates a separation between the market decision (driving on a
toll road) and the tax assessment (the toll payment). In a sense, the base price of driving
on a toll road becomes zero with electronic toll collection, plus a toll surcharge added

separately when taxpayers add money to their electronic-toll-collection accounts.
35 Jacob Nussim, To Confuse and Protect: Taxes and Consumer Protection, 1 Colum. J.
Tax L. 218, 253-55 (2010).
36 The behavioral literature on retirement savings decisions may also be relevant for this

question. See, e.g., Olivia S. Mitchell & Stephen P. Utkus, Lessons from Behavioral Public
Finance for Retirement Plan Design, in Pension Design and Structure: New Lessons from
Behavioral Finance 3 (Olivia S. Mitchell & Stephen P. Utkus eds., 2004).
37 There is also a related literature on how tax salience affects compliance decisions.
See, e.g., Christoph Watrin & Robert Ullman, Comparing Direct and Indirect Taxation:
The Influence of Framing on Tax Compliance, 5 Eur. J. Comp. Econ. 33 (2008).
38 Tomer Blumkin, Bradley J. Ruffle & Yosef Ganun, Are Income and Consumption
Taxes Ever Really Equivalent? Evidence from a Real-Effort Experiment with Real Goods
3 (Ctr. for Econ. Studies, Working Paper No. 2194, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/ab-
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Contrary to the predictions of standard economic theory, the experimental subjects' labor-supply decisions were significantly more responsive to the wage tax than to the consumption tax. 39 Second,
David Gamage, Andrew Hayashi, and Brent Nakamura, studied the
labor-supply choices of experimental subjects faced with economically
equivalent compensation amounts displayed using different tax-salience frames. 40 The experimental subjects were much less willing to
work when their compensation was presented as a lower base wage
plus a bonus than when their compensation was presented as a higher
base wage minus a tax. 4 1 These two experimental studies thus suggest
that spotlighting may reduce the market salience of how taxes affect
labor-supply decisions, in addition to affecting consumer purchasing
decisions.
Nevertheless, it is important to emphasize that the spotlighting literature is still at an early stage of development. Care should be taken in
speculating about spotlighting behavior outside of the narrow contexts
of the existing studies. In particular, it should be kept in mind that
spotlighting may be limited by factors like taxpayers learning through
experience, 42 or taxpayers' aversion to being manipulated. 43 Market
stract=1079784 ("Our results reveal that the temporal separation between an individual's
labor market allocation and subsequent consumption decisions leads individuals to work
longer when faced with a consumption tax than with an equivalent wage tax."). Blumkin,
Ruffle, and Ganun claim that their results have implications for the debate over income
and consumption taxation. Id. at 1-2. Their experiment, however, does not incorporate
savings or investment behavior, so their wage tax is not really an "income tax" as income
taxes are traditionally defined. Indeed, their wage tax resembles a form of cash-flow consumption tax. Instead, their results suggest that-for both income taxes and consumption
taxes-market decisions may differ depending on whether the tax is assessed at the point
where income is earned or at the point where income is spent. Id. at 3.
39 Id.
40 David Gamage, Andrew Hayashi & Brent K. Nakamura, Experimental Evidence of
Tax Framing Effects on the Work/Leisure Decision 3 (June 18, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1629919.
41 This result may have implications for the design of the Earned Income Tax Credit and
similar tax-based bonuses, potentially implying that direct wage subsidies could be more
effective at increasing labor supply. Id. at 16.
42 See, e.g., Oren Bar-Gill & Franco Ferrari, Informing Consumers About Themselves, 3
Erasmus L. Rev. 93, 97-98 (2010) (evaluating effects of interpersonal learning, use-pattern
information, and seller reputation); Alexander L. Brown, Zhikang Chua & Colin F.
Camerer, Learning and Visceral Temptation in Dynamic Saving Experiments, 124 Q.J.
Econ. 197, 198 (2009) (explaining experimental results where subjects at first saved too
little, but then learned to save more optimally after social learning).
43 There is ample evidence from the consumer behavior literature that consumers may
react negatively if they perceive themselves as being manipulated. Field studies have
shown that the impact of price-presentation techniques can disappear if consumers become
skeptical of vendor's intentions or come to believe that vendors are using misleading pricepresentation strategies. Indeed, the empirical evidence suggests that moderate use of techniques for reducing price salience is often more effective than high use, as high use can
lead to consumer backlash. See, e.g., Yih Hwai Lee & Cheng Yuen Han, Partitioned Pricing in Advertising: Effects on Brand and Retailer Attitudes, 13 Marketing Letters 27, 37-
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mechanisms might also develop over time to assist taxpayers in overcoming some tax-design elements that initially result in reduced market salience. 44 The existing literature-especially the Chetty, Looney,
and Kroft article-suggests that these potentially limiting factors do
not always counteract spotlighting behavior. 45 But further empirical
research will still be needed to determine the importance of spotlighting within different tax contexts.
2.

Ironing

The second strand of empirical research on the market salience of
taxation examines "ironing" behavior. According to Liebman and
Zeckhauser, "ironing arises when an individual facing a multipart
schedule perceives only the average price to the point where he consumes. '46 In other words, ironing occurs when taxpayers incorrectly
use their average tax rates when making market decisions rather than
their effective marginal tax rates.
We expect that ironing behavior is important in its own right. But it
is also worth discussing ironing to illustrate the many possible ways in
which taxpayers might respond to complexity in tax-price schedules.
In essence, ironing is a form of spotlighting behavior wherein taxpayers spotlight on their average tax rates instead of using their effective
marginal tax rates.4 7 When pricing schedules are complex, it can be
39 (2002); Morwitz et al., note 22, at 25-27; Robert Schindler, Maureen Morrin & Nada
Bechwati, Shipping Charges and Shipping-Charge Skepticism: Implications for Direct
Marketers' Pricing Formats, 19 J. Interactive Marketing 41, 43 (2005); Shibin Sheng, Yeqing Bao & Yue Pan, Partitioning or Bundling? Perceived Fairness of the Surcharge Makes
a Difference, 24 Psychol. & Marketing 1025, 1032-33 (2007).
44 See, e.g., Nava Ashraf, Dean Karlan & Wesley Yin, Tying Odysseus to the Mast: Evidence from a Commitment Savings Product in the Philippines, 121 Q.J. Econ. 635, 635-39
(2006) (describing research on financial products that assist consumers in overcoming timeinconsistent decision-making biases); John List, Does Market Experience Eliminate Market Anomalies?, 118 Q.J. Econ. 41, 41 (2003) (finding that market experience can counteract certain cognitive biases).
45 But see Nussim, note 35, at 234 n.77.
The results of [the Chetty, Looney, and Kroft] study are presumably sensitive to its design. First, the study was conducted in a "tax-exclusive environment." That is, U.S. consumers are used to tax-exclusive price presentation
and may have been confused by the mere change in the environment rather
than the form of price presentation. Second, the study was conducted over a
limited set of products, and in particular, over a limited period of time. These
facts exacerbate the mentioned effect. Overall, Chetty et al. might have only
measured a "shock" effect or the reaction of consumers to new transaction
costs in analyzing a new pricing system.
We find Nussim's cautionary notes somewhat persuasive with respect to the grocery
store experiment, but not with respect to their study of alcohol sales and excise taxes.
46 Liebman & Zeckhauser, note 20, at 2.
47 Nevertheless, we stick with Liebman and Zeckhauser's approach of discussing spotlighting and ironing as two distinct hypotheses.
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hard to predict which components of a price schedule taxpayers may
spotlight on. Indeed, taxpayers may be as likely to spotlight on aspects of their tax-price schedules that cause them to overestimate
their effective tax rates (thus making the taxes overly market-salient)
as on ones that reduce market salience. 48 The spotlighting hypothesis
is easiest to operationalize for instruments like sales taxes where there
is a straightforward pretax price posted at the time of market decisionmaking. For complex tax schedules-like those in the income taxthe spotlighting hypothesis on its own does not generate useful predictions. 49 Numerous empirical studies demonstrate that taxpayers find
the income tax confusing and often do not know their effective income tax rates. 5 0 Yet merely showing that taxpayers are often con51
fused tells us little about the market salience of taxation.
Hence, the spotlighting hypothesis does not predict what taxpayers
will spotlight on of the many price components embedded in the income tax. The ironing hypothesis is important because it does predict
how taxpayers are likely to respond to a specific form of confusion
regarding complicated tax rate schedules. Specifically, the ironing hypothesis predicts how taxpayers may respond to nonlinear schedules
of multiple rates, as in the progressive tax rates of the income tax.
In an early experimental study of ironing, Charles de Bartolome
found that experimental subjects often use their average tax rates

48 For analogous results with respect to consumer reactions to private-sector pricing
strategies, see Kim & Kachersky, note 29, at 139-40; Morwitz et al., note 22, at 36 ("[F]irms
need to understand that partitioned pricing benefits firms in many situations, but certainly
not in all situations ....

If some or all of these factors are absent, however, partitioned

pricing can have no positive impact, or even a negative one.").
49 Nussim's speculation that the income tax may have reduced market salience to the
extent that workers focus on pretax salaries when making job choice decisions might be an
exception. See note 35 and accompanying text. But note that even this prediction concerns the market salience of the income tax as a whole as compared to the market salience
of pretax salaries. Most of the debate about the market salience of the income tax has
concerned specific provisions like the alternative minimum tax or the use of phase-outs.
For the most part, the spotlighting hypothesis is not sufficiently nuanced to yield straightforward predictions about the market salience of specific provisions of the income tax.
50 Liebman & Zeckhauser, note 20, at 6 ("A substantial body of research indicates that
people do not understand their tax schedules."); Timothy J. Rupert, Louise E. Single &
Arnold M. Wright, The Impact of Floors and Phase-Outs on Taxpayers' Decisions and
Understanding of Marginal Tax Rates, J. Am. Tax'n Ass'n, Spring 2003, at 72, 72-73;
Timothy J. Rupert & Arnold M. Wright, The Use of Marginal Tax Rates in Decision Making: The Impact of Tax Rate Visibility, J. Am. Tax'n Ass'n, Fall 1998, at 83, 83; Raj Chetty
& Emmanuel Saez, Teaching the Tax Code: Earnings Responses to an Experiment with
EITC Recipients (NBER, Working Paper No. 14836, 2009), available at http://wwxv.nber.
org/papers/wl4836.
51 Under our definition, tax salience only refers to when taxpayers systematically underestimate or overestimate their tax liabilities. See note 13 and accompanying text.
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when making market decisions rather than their marginal tax rates. 52
Liebman and Zeckhauser later confirmed de Bartolome's results by
econometrically studying taxpayers' reactions to the introduction of
the child tax credit. 53 Most recently, Naomi Feldman and Peter
Katuscak provide further support for these conclusions, additionally
demonstrating that taxpayers make market decisions partially based
on their average tax rates from prior years, even controlling for the
54
relationship between prior and current year tax status.
We earlier concluded that the spotlighting literature is still in its
adolescence. 55 The ironing literature is at an even earlier stage of development. 56 There is substantial evidence that complicated tax
schedules can induce taxpayer confusion and error. 5 7 But the market
salience literature only provides limited means for predicting the direction of complexity-induced taxpayer error. Further empirical work
is needed before the ironing hypothesis should be used to guide realworld tax policy. Yet the ironing hypothesis remains the second most
demonstrated finding of the market-salience literature (after the spotlighting hypothesis). 58 The ironing hypothesis is thus worth considering both in its own right and as an illustration of our limited
understanding of the relationship between tax complexity and market
salience.
B.

Reviewing the Empirical Literature on PoliticalSalience

Numerous scholars have claimed that certain tax instruments or certain forms of tax design have low political salience, such that voters
52 Charles A.M. de Bartolome, Which Tax Rate Do People Use: Average or Marginal?,
56 J. Pub. Econ. 79, 79-80 (1995).
53 Liebman & Zeckhauser, note 20, at 33-42.
54 Naomi E. Feldman & Peter Katuscak, Should the Average Tax Rate Be Marginalized?, (Acad. of Scis. of the Czech Republic, Ctr. for Econ. Research & Graduate Educ.,
Econ. Inst., Working Paper No. 304, 2006), available at http://www.cerge-ei.cz/pdf/wp/
Wp304.pdf.
55 See Subsection II.A.1.
56 Notably, Ed McCaffery has suggested based on his teaching experience that some
taxpayers may confuse marginal and average tax rates in the opposite direction, using their
highest marginal rates in place of their average rates when making decisions for which
more than just the highest marginal rate is applicable. Edward J. McCaffery, Cognitive
Theory and Tax, 41 UCLA L. Rev. 1861, 1890 (1994). Note that McCaffery's writing predates the empirical work on the ironing hypothesis. His views may have since changed.
Nevertheless, McCaffery's discussion supports the need for further empirical work to explore the contours of the ironing hypothesis.
57 See note 50 and accompanying text.
58 Another related market salience hypothesis presented in a recent paper is that tax
rate adjustments are more salient than tax base adjustments. Kay Blaufus, Jonathan Bob,
Jochen Hundsdoerfer, Dirk Kiesewetter & Joachim Weimann, It's All About Tax Rates:
An Empirical Study of Tax Perception, (arqus Discussion Paper No. 106, 2009), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1707445.
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discount tax costs imposed through these forms of taxation. 59 The
literature on political salience is over a century old, dating back at
least to John Stuart Mill. 60 Only a portion of this literature has at-

tempted to empirically test any of the ways in which taxes have been
alleged to have low political salience. Nevertheless, even the empiri-

cal portion of the political salience literature is many times larger than
the entire literature on market salience. In this Section, we review the
major themes of the empirical literature on political salience, but our
61
coverage is by no means exhaustive.

It is important to emphasize at the outset that most of the ways in
which scholars have hypothesized that tax instruments may have low
political salience remain unconfirmed empirically. The political sali-

ence literature has yet to produce any results as clear as Chetty,
Looney, and Kroft's spotlighting finding for the market salience of
sales taxes. 62 Indeed, it has been notoriously difficult to test hypotheses for political salience. 6 3 According to Robert Sausgruber and Jean-

Robert Tyran, the main reason for this inconclusiveness in the empirical literature is that most studies have been unable to disentangle the

effects of political salience on voting behavior from other reasons why
voters might prefer different levels of taxation (or differing use of specific forms of tax design). 64 For the most part, we have only a tenta-

tive understanding for how any of the factors discussed in the political
salience literature affect actual voting behavior.
Nevertheless, the political salience literature has identified a num-

ber of hypotheses that seem plausible (even if their plausibility is
based on anecdotal evidence), and the intuitions underlying these hy-

potheses are widely held. We thus review a number of factors that
have been hypothesized to influence the political salience of taxation,
59 For a partial review of this literature (focused on studies by economists and some
political scientists), see Oates, note 13, at 65-82.
60 Mill, note 3, at 237.
61 We do aim for a mostly comprehensive discussion of the major themes in the empirical literature on political salience, as we hope that later scholars will find this Section useful
as a reference, but the literature on political salience is simply too extensive to be exhaustively reviewed within a single article.
62 Arguably, Finkelstein's results for electronic toll collection and Cabral and Hoxby's
results for anti-property tax referenda might be exceptions, but these contexts strikes us as
much narrower than Chetty, Looney, and Kroft's sales and excise taxes. See notes 77-79,
93-96, 106-07 and accompanying text.
63 E.g., Finkelstein, note 4, at 2 ("Empirical evidence of the impact of tax salience on tax
rates, however, has proved extremely elusive."); Oates, note 13, at 66 ("[T]he detection
and measurement of fiscal illusion is a difficult enterprise .... the existing empirical literature has not as yet made a persuasive case for the[ ]existence and importance [of the elements of fiscal illusion]."); Sausgruber & Tyran, note 3, at 40 ("[I]t is difficult to measure a
misperception of the tax burden .... ").
64 See Sausgruber & Tyran, note 3, at 42; see also Brian E. Dollery & Andrew C. Worthington, The Empirical Analysis of Fiscal Illusion, 10 J. Econ. Survs. 261, 293-94 (1996).
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including: (1) indirect taxes, (2) tax-system complexity, (3) withholding, (4) deficit financing, (5) sticky baselines, and (6) tax-label aversion. Scholars have cited each of these as support for the conclusion
that voters discount certain tax costs. 65 Much of the existing political
salience literature has been concerned with the notion that these factors might lead voters to discount the aggregate costs of all taxes collected by a government (the so-called "size-of-government"
question). 66 We include within our discussion, however, hypotheses
for how tax design might affect voters' perceptions of the costs imposed by only specific forms of taxation, even when the hypotheses
67
are not alleged to increase the overall size of government.
1.

Indirect Taxes

That the use of indirect taxes may reduce political salience is perhaps the most cited of the political salience hypotheses. 6s The term
"indirect taxes" refers to tax instruments for which the statutory incidence falls on businesses or other intermediaries rather than on individual taxpayers. For example, economists generally agree that the
69
incidence of value added taxes (VATs) primarily falls on consumers.
Yet consumers do not directly remit VAT costs. Instead, VAT costs
are simply incorporated into the final prices paid by consumers in the
70
same fashion as are the other costs of producing goods.
See notes 68, 85, 97, 109, and 119.
See Daniel N. Shaviro, Taxes, Spending, and the U.S. Government's March Toward
Bankruptcy 15 (2007) ("It rarely occurs to either side that they may misunderstand the
basic relationship here between means and ends-that is, between tax and spending cuts
and the size of government.").
67 In particular, our discussion of the tax-label aversion hypothesis notes that voter opposition to only those forms of government activity that are labeled as "taxes" can result in
this activity simply being shifted into other forms such as tax expenditures or regulation.
See Subsection II.B.6.
68 E.g., Richard Bird, Policy Forum: Visibility and Accountability-Is Tax-Inclusive
Pricing a Good Thing?, 58 Can. Tax J. 63, 63-65 (2010); Gary S. Becker & Casey B. Mulligan, Deadweight Costs and the Size of Government, 46 J.L. & Econ. 293, 304 (2003); Andrea Louise Campbell, What Americans Think of Taxes, in The New Fiscal Sociology 48,
50 (Isaac William Martin, Ajay K. Mehrotra & Monica Prasad eds., 2009); John G. Cullis &
Philip R. Jones, Fiscal Illusion and "Excessive" Budgets: Some Indirect Evidence, 15 Pub.
Fin. Rev. 219, 224 (1987); Michael J. Graetz, 100 Million Unnecessary Returns, A Fresh
Start for the U.S. Tax System, 112 Yale L.J. 261, 270 (2002); Steven M. Sheffrin, Perceptions of Fairness in the Crucible of Tax Policy, in Tax Progressivity and Income Inequality
309, 312-13 (Joel Slemrod ed., 1994).
69 E.g., Richard M. Bird & Pierre-Pascal Gendron, The VAT in Developing and Transitional Countries 71 (2007); Alan Tait, Robert Ebel & Tuan Minh Lee, Value-Added Tax,
National, in The Encyclopedia of Taxation and Tax Policy 461, 461-63 (Joseph J. Cordes,
Robert D. Ebel & Jane G. Gravelle eds., 2005).
70 Canada's VAT (called the Goods and Services Tax or GST) is apparently something
of an exception, as vendors post prices on store aisles that do not include the vendors' GST
65

66
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In addition to VATs, other indirect taxes include corporate income
taxes (and most other business-level taxes), the employer-paid portion
of the U.S. payroll tax, most tariffs, most excise taxes, and property
taxes with respect to renters. 71 The economics literature generally
finds that at least a portion of the economic burden of these taxes falls
72
on consumers in the form of higher prices paid for purchased goods.
Yet all of these tax instruments are remitted by intermediaries, rather
than by consumers, such that most voters do not personally experience the payment of these tax revenues to the government. Because
voters do not personally remit indirect taxes, numerous scholars have
argued that indirect taxes have low political salience and that the use
of indirect taxes leads voters to support higher levels of taxation and
73
government spending.
A number of empirical studies report evidence suggesting that individuals sometimes discount indirect tax burdens as compared to
equivalent direct tax burdens. 74 Yet other studies have failed to find a
significant relationship between the use of indirect taxes and higher
government spending. 75 In any case, the intuition underlying the indicosts. David M. Sherman, Policy Forum: Tax-Included Pricing for HST-Are We There
Yet?, 57 Can. Tax J. 839, 842 (2009).
71 The notion that property taxes have low political salience for renters has spawned its
own sub-literature. E.g., Oates, note 13, at 72-73.
72 E.g., Jonathan Gruber, Public Finance and Public Policy 559-85 (3d ed. 2011); James
M. Poterba, Retail Price Reactions to Changes in State and Local Sales Taxes, 49 Nat'l Tax
J. 165, 173 (1996).
Note that these tax instruments are indirect regardless of who ultimately bears the incidence. For example, the economic burden of the corporate tax is divided between consumers, workers, and investors, since corporations cannot ultimately bear the economic
incidence of taxation. To the extent the incidence of the corporate income tax falls on
consumers through higher prices for purchased goods, the corporate income tax is an indirect tax on consumers. But to the extent the tax falls on workers (through lower wages) or
on investors (through lower return to capital), the corporate income tax is an indirect tax
on workers or on investors. Regardless of its incidence, the corporate income tax is still an
indirect tax and those bearing the incidence of the tax may find it less politically salient as a
consequence.
73 See, e.g., Friedman, note 11, at 116.
74 E.g., Norman Gemmell, Oliver Morrissey & Abuzer Pinar, Tax Perceptions and the
Demand for Public Expenditure: Evidence from UK Micro Data, 19 Eur. J. Pol. Econ.
793, 793-94 (2003); Michael Keen & Ben Lockwood, Is the VAT a Money Machine?, 59
Nat'l Tax. J. 905, 911 n.9 (2006) (though the authors in this case explicitly disclaim that this
effect is necessarily related to the VAT being "hidden"); Edward McCaffery & Jonathan
Baron, Thinking About Tax, 12 Psychol. Pub. Pol'y & L. 106, 119-20 (2006); Werner W.
Pommerehne & Friedrich Schneider, Fiscal Illusions, Political Institutions and Local Public
Spending, 31 Kyklos 381, 383 (1978); Sausgruber & Tyran, note 3, at 39. Note that the
empirical results suggesting that the use of VATs may lead to higher government spending
levels could be due to VATs being more efficient, rather than to their being indirect taxes.
E.g., Becker & Mulligan, note 68, at 304.
75 E.g., Oates, note 13, at 72-73; Erik Schokkaert, Preferences and Demand for Local
Public Spending, 34 J. Pub. Econ. 175, 187 (1987). Indirect taxes may have low political
salience even if their use does not result in higher government spending, but the

Imaged with the permission of Tax Law Review of New York University School of Law

2011]

THREE ESSAYS ON TAX SALIENCE

rect taxes hypothesis strikes many as convincing. As George Lowenstein, Deborah Small, and Jeff Strnad write:
[Tihe psychology and thus the politics of taxation may turn
on who appears to pay the tax rather than who actually bears
the burden. The public tends to ascribe the burden to the
nominal payor and to ignore taxes that they do not explicitly

pay. For example, to most consumers, the VAT tax is simply
part of the purchase price of an item. The nominal payors
are businesses. One argument against adopting a VAT tax in
the United States has been the worry that there would be too
76
little resistance to raising taxes exactly because it is hidden.
To fully evaluate the hypothesis that the costs of indirect taxes have
less political salience, it is necessary to consider how the businesses
and intermediaries charged with remitting these taxes interact in the
political domain. Just because the statutory incidence of a tax falls on
a narrow group does not necessarily mean that the tax has low political salience. Even considering only individual voting behavior-ex-

cluding lobbying by business interests-a business group charged with
remitting a tax might still plausibly engage in sufficient political advertising so as to significantly affect the voting behavior of individuals
who indirectly bear the burden of the tax. 77 Expanding the discussion

to include lobbying and other forms of political activity by business
groups would provide even further grounds for questioning whether
the costs of indirect taxes necessarily have less political salience. 78
econometric study of the political salience of indirect taxes requires the use of some dependent variable, and government spending levels are a commonly used choice.
76 George Loewenstein, Deborah A. Small & Jeff Strnad, Statistical, Identifiable and
Iconic Victims, in Behavioral Public Finance 32, 39 (Edward J. McCaffery & Joel Slemrod
eds., 2006).
An alternative intuition for why the use of indirect taxes might reduce political salience
relates to the endowment effect. In regard to taxation, whether taxpayers perceive taxes as
losses from their pretax endowments, or as reduced gains from engaging in market transactions, may determine whether the endowment effect comes into play. Indirect taxes may
often be viewed as forgone gains whereas equivalent direct taxes would be viewed as
losses. See Edward J. McCaffery & Jonathan Baron, Isolation Effects and the Neglect of
Indirect Effects of Fiscal Policies, 19 J. Behav. Decision Making 289, 290 (2006); McCaffery, note 56, at 1874-76.
77 See Joel Slemrod & Jon Bakija, Taxing Ourselves: A Citizen's Guide to the Debate
over Taxes 140 (4th ed. 2008) ("[W]henever any kind of tax increase or elimination of tax
preference is threatened, those who perceive themselves to be losers immediately produce
and publicize a study purporting to show how many jobs it will cost.").
78 Indeed, it has often been argued that narrow interest groups have disproportionate
influence on the legislative agenda as compared to diffuse interest groups. See generally,
Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups
(1971). It is not clear, however, to what extent intermediaries charged with remitting an
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Ultimately, the question of whether indirect taxes have lower political salience than equivalent direct taxes can only be answered through
empirical study, and the empirical literature on this question remains
inconclusive. 79 Yet despite the lack of conclusive empirical findings,
political commentators frequently criticize the use of indirect taxes on
political salience grounds, and many important political actors argue
against increased use of indirect taxes based primarily on the contention that these taxes have low political salience. As Bruce Bartlett
provocatively writes:
The Wall Street Journal, for example, continually argues
against the VAT on the grounds that if we were ever to adopt
such an insidious form of taxation we would very quickly become just like Europe, as if the entire continent is one big
Gulag instead of someplace where by and large the people

are just as free and prosperous as Americans.80

2.

Tax System Complexity

Another frequently cited political salience hypothesis concerns tax
system complexity. Of particular focus has been the notion that the
use of multiple smaller tax instruments (as opposed to having only a

single comprehensive tax instrument) may lead voters to underestimate their aggregate tax burdens. For example, James Buchanan has
indirect tax face incentives to lobby or campaign against the tax when they do not bear the
economic burden of the tax.
79 Finkelstein, note 4, at 970. Note that laboratory-style experiments-which so far have
provided the best evidence in support of the indirect-taxes hypothesis-cannot fully control for the possible countervailing effects of the political activity of business groups. A
particularly interesting recent experimental study by Sausgruber and Tyran found that
their experimental subjects initially preferred indirect taxes over equivalent direct taxes;
however, in subsequent rounds of the experiment, Sausgruber and Tyran found that the
combination of allowing their subjects to experience the impact of the indirect taxes on
prices (in an admittedly simplistic design), and allowing their subjects to deliberate, dramatically reduced the subjects' preferences for indirect taxes over direct taxes. Rupert
Sausgruber & Jean-Robert Tyran, Tax Salience, Voting, and Deliberation (Univ. of Copenhagen Dep't of Econ., Discussion Paper No. 08-21, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1292731. In another important recent experimental study, Edward McCaffery and
Jonathan Baron found that their experimental subjects initially preferred indirect business
taxes to direct income taxes, but that priming the subjects to think about the progressivity
of the tax instruments alleviated this effect. McCaffery & Baron, note 76, at 294. There is
thus reason to conclude both that the use of indirect taxes may initially reduce political
salience and that voter learning and the political activities of business groups may decrease
this effect over time.
80 Bruce Bartlett, The VAT and the Money-Machine Argument, Capital Gains and
Games (Sept. 11, 2009, 5:39 PM), http://capitalgainsandgames.com/blog/bruce-bartlett/
1639/vat-and-money-machine-argument.
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argued that "[t]o the extent that the total tax load on an individual can
be fragmented so that he confronts numerous small levies rather than
a few significant ones, illusionary effects may be created." 81 Similar
arguments have been made about tax instruments (like sales taxes)
that are paid in small amounts over time, as compared to tax instruments (like the property taxes in some states, or income taxes in the
payabsence of withholding) for which taxpayers make lump-sum
82
ments of their aggregate tax liabilities on an annual basis.
As another argument related to tax system complexity, many theorists have speculated that reducing compliance costs may lower the
political salience of taxation. 83 Of course, to the extent that increasing
compliance costs raises the real burden imposed by taxation, this effect is unrelated to tax salience. If voters oppose taxation only to the
extent taxes impose real economic burdens, raising compliance costs
to increase political salience would be normatively equivalent to hiking tax rates and then throwing away the revenues generated so that
the revenues cannot be used to fund government spending.8 4 Such an
approach can only be defended if one views government spending as
creating negative value even when the government financing is
costless. Merely believing that government spending is wasteful does
not in itself justify destroying economic resources for the purposes of
depriving the government of those resources.
Hence, most sophisticated arguments for increasing compliance
costs depend on the assumption that doing so heightens political salience beyond the direct effects of the compliance costs. The intuition
appears to be that complexity-induced compliance costs lead taxpayers to spend more time thinking about tax calculations-or to develop
more negative feelings about taxation-and that this increases the political salience of taxation. For instance, incurring compliance costs
such as by filling out income tax forms may force taxpayers to think
81 James Buchanan, Public Finance in Democratic Process: Fiscal Institutions and Individual Choice 135 (1967).
82 E.g., Aradhna Krishna & Joel Slemrod, Behavioral Public Finance: Tax Design as
Price Presentation, 10 Int'l Tax & Pub. Fin. 189, 189 (2003); Andrea Campbell, How Americans Think About Taxes: Public Opinion and the American Fiscal State 7 (forthcoming

2012).
83 E.g., Lawrence Zelenak, Justice Holmes, Ralph Kramden, and the Civic Virtues of a
Tax Return Filing Requirement, 61 Tax L. Rev. 53, 57 (2007) ("Some small-government
conservatives argue that taxes should be as visible and as painful as possible, on the theory

that the public will resist high levels of visible and painful taxes."); see also Finkelstein,
note 4, at 969-70; H. Geoffrey Brennan & James M. Buchanan, Towards a Tax Constitution
for Leviathan, 8 J. Pub. Econ. 255, 256 (1977).
84 See Daniel Shaviro, Do Deficits Matter? 103 (1997) ("[The adherents of making taxes
painful] show their misunderstanding when they treat the imposition of excess burden
through taxation as an alternativeto feeding Leviathan rather than as an example of Leviathan at work.").
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about their tax burdens even if they would prefer not to do so. Although forcing taxpayers to make painful tax calculations harms the
taxpayers, a small-government advocate might view this harm as justified if it then leads voters to become more opposed to taxation and
spending to a sufficient degree that the resulting "benefit" of increased voter opposition to taxation exceeds the harm from the compliance costs. As Finkelstein explains:
[C]ompliance costs impose a deadweight burden on society.
Yet policies that would reduce these costs are frequently opposed by policy makers and economists who believe that
compliance costs play an important role in keeping taxes visible and salient to the electorate, who then serve as an important check on attempts to raise the scale of government
85
activity beyond what an informed citizenry would want.
As with the indirect taxes hypothesis, the empirical literature on
how tax system complexity affects voting behavior remains indeterminate. 86 The most important line of empirical research on this question
began with Richard Wagner in 1976.87 Wagner devised a measure of
aggregate tax system complexity and found a strong correlation between this measure and government expenditure levels. 88 Wagner
viewed this result as confirming that tax system complexity leads voters to underestimate their tax burdens, and thus to support higher
levels of tax-financed spending.8 9 Subsequent studies have pointed
out limitations in Wagner's approach. 90 Correcting for these limitations, some empirical studies have found results similar to Wagner's, 91
while others have failed to find any significant correlations between
measures of tax system complexity and government expenditure
92
levels.
85
86
87
Pub.

Finkelstein, note 4, at 969.
For a review of this literature, see Dollery & Worthington, note 64, at 264-71.
Richard E. Wagner, Revenue Structure, Fiscal Illusion, and Budgetary Choice, 25
Choice 45 (1976).

88 Id. at 53-59.
89 Id. at 57-59.

90 Oates, note 13, at 69-70 (summarizing studies).
91 E.g., Samuel H. Baker, The Determinants of Median Voter Tax Liability: An Empirical Test of the Fiscal Illusion Hypothesis, 11 Pub. Fin. Q. 95, 105 (1983); Pommerehne &
Schneider, note 74, at 398-404.
92 E.g., Magnus Henrekson, Swedish Government Growth: A Disequilibrium Analysis,
in Explaining the Growth of Government 93, 119 (J.A. Lybeck & M. Henrekson eds.,
1988); Walter S. Misiolek & Harold W. Elder, Tax Structure and the Size of Government:
An Empirical Analysis of the Fiscal Illusion and Fiscal Stress Arguments, 57 Pub. Choice
233, 241 (1988); Vincent G. Munley & Kenneth V. Greene, Fiscal Illusion, the Nature of
Public Goods and Equation Specification, 33 Pub. Choice, no. 1, 1978, at 95, 97-99.
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As the most important recent empirical study of the tax system
complexity hypothesis, Finkelstein examined how toll rates respond to
the introduction of electronic-toll collection. 93 Finkelstein found that
"drivers are substantially less aware of tolls paid electronically" and
that implementing electronic-toll collection results in tolls that "are 20
to 40 percent higher than they would have been" otherwise. 94 Importantly, Finkelstein distinguishes between the political salience effects
of electronic-toll collection and effects due to making toll collection
more efficient such as by reducing compliance costs. 95 In our view,
Finkelstein's study reports the most clear empirical support for any of
the political salience hypotheses. Nevertheless, as Finkelstein emphaaffects
sizes, her results "leave open the question of how tax salience
96
context.
collection
electronic-toll
the
of
outside
rates"
tax
3.

Withholding

Another tax design element that has been hypothesized to reduce
political salience is withholding. Milton Friedman famously regretted
his role in creating the system of withholding for federal income taxes,
arguing that income tax withholding has played a major role in the
97
growth of U.S. government spending during the twentieth century.
In his words: "It never occurred to me at the time that I was helping
to develop machinery that would make possible a government that I
severely as too large, too intrusive, too dewould come to criticize
98
freedom.
of
structive
The existing literature is not entirely clear as to what it is about
withholding that is thought to reduce the political salience of taxation.
It sometimes has been posited that breaking tax remittances into
smaller regular payments-as opposed to a single larger paymentmay reduce the political salience of the tax liabilities. 99 If breaking up
large payments is the dominant way in which withholding affects political salience, then withholding probably should be thought of as a subfactor of the tax system complexity hypothesis. 10 0 Yet other accounts
93 We earlier discussed the implications of Finkelstein's study for the spotlighting market
salience hypothesis. See note 62 and accompanying text.
94 Finkelstein, note 4, at 969.
95 Id. at 1002-08.
96 Id. at 1009.
97 Friedman, note 11, at 113-14; see also Dick Armey, Why America Needs the Flat Tax,
in Fairness and Efficiency in the Flat Tax 96, 99 (1996) ("If America had not accepted
withholding ... the government could never have grown as large as it has.").
98Milton Friedman & Rose D. Friedman, Two Lucky People 123 (1998).
99 E.g., Krishna & Slemrod, note 82, at 193-94; Cabral & Hoxby, note 18, at 3-4.
100 See Subsection II.B.2 (discussing the argument that numerous smaller tax liabilities
may have less political salience than fewer larger tax liabilities).
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appear to suggest that voters may not fully pay attention to amounts
taken out of their salaries prior to the receipt of their paychecks. 101
Thus, it could be that withholding serves to manipulate the framing of
tax liabilities, such that tax liabilities subject to withholding are viewed
more like money that is never received, and less like coercive extractions from a taxpayer's income. 10 2 If this is the operative mechanism,
then the withholding hypothesis may bear more relation to the indirect-taxes hypothesis, and particularly to the endowment effect, than
to the tax system complexity hypothesis. Because it is unclear
whether withholding is best thought of as a subfactor of the tax system
complexity hypothesis, or of the indirect-taxes hypothesis, or as a
combination of both of these hypotheses, we discuss withholding as an

independent hypothesis for how tax design may reduce the political
salience of taxation.
Although numerous studies have reported that taxpayers often
withhold more than seems optimal' 03-in effect giving "interest free
loans to the government" 1 0 4-only

one paper has reported evidence

directly supporting the intuition that withholding reduces political salience. 10 5 That paper, by Marika Cabral and Caroline Hoxby, found
that the use of a form of withholding for property taxes (called "tax
escrow") results in less voter support for state referenda limiting property taxes. 10 6 Cabral and Hoxby did not find, however, that use of tax
101See Armey, note 97, at 99 ("Only by taking people's money before they ever see it
has the government been able to raise taxes to their current height without sparking a
revolt."); see also Subsection II.B.1, for discussion of an analogous intuition with respect to
indirect taxes.
102 Along these lines, it has been suggested that withheld income may not be incorporated into taxpayers' endowments-as in the endowment effect-such that taxpayers may
be more politically averse to paying additional taxes at the end of the year than to having
amounts withheld regularly from their paychecks. See Kyle D. Logue & Joel Slemrod, Of
Coase, Calabresi, and Optimal Tax Liability, 63 Tax L. Rev. 797, 848-49 (2010); see also
Shaviro, note 66, at 23-25 (for a more general discussion of the endowment effect and
taxation); note 76 (for a discussion of the endowment effect in relation to the indirect-taxes
hypothesis).
103 E.g., Donna D. Bobek, Richard C. Hatfield, & Kristin Wentzel, An Investigation of
Why Taxpayers Prefer Refunds: A Theory of Planned Behavior Approach 29, J. Am.
Tax'n Ass'n 93-94 (20070; Damon Jones, Inertia and Overwithholding: Explaining the
Prevalence of Income Tax Refunds, 4 Am. Econ. J. Econ. Pol'y (forthcoming 2012).
104 Benjamin C. Ayres, Steven J. Kachelmeier & John R. Robinson, Why Do People
Give Interest-Free Loans to the Government? An Experimental Study of Interim Tax
Payments, 21 J. Am. Tax'n Ass'n 55, 55 (1999).
105 For some additional suggestive evidence that withholding may lead to larger government, which may be due to withholding increasing the efficiency of income taxation rather
than due to political salience, see Libor Dusek, Are Efficient Taxes Responsible for Big
Government? Evidence from Tax Withholding 26-27 (May 9, 2006) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1585119. For a
general discussion, see Krishna & Slemrod, note 82, at 193-94.
106 See Cabral & Hoxby, note 18, at 36-42.
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escrow led voters to underestimate the magnitude of property taxes
when answering survey questions; instead, tax escrow appears to increase confusion regarding property taxes, which then reduces voter
support for anti-property tax referenda.1 07 A form of tax presentation
that affects voting on property tax limitations in a referendum is an
example of tax presentation impacting political salience. It is unclear,
however, whether Cabral and Hoxby's results can be generalized to
other forms of tax-related political decision-making.
Regardless, there appears to be widespread agreement that withholding generally reduces political salience. 10 8 As Kyle Logue and
Joel Slemrod explain, "many conservatives dislike withholding because it reduces the visibility of tax collection and thus reduces the
perceived cost of government." 10 9 Several conservative legislators
have even proposed legislation to end income tax withholding, arguing for this position on political salience grounds.1 10

4.

Deficit Financing

Another hypothesis for how tax design may reduce political salience
concerns the use of deficit financing."' Paying for government expenditures with deficit financing can delay the need to levy taxes to
fund those expenditures. 11 2 If voters discount their future tax liabilities in assessing the desirability of government spending, then deficit
financing may lead voters to support higher levels of government expenditures by reducing the political salience of the increased future
tax liabilities that the voters eventually will need to incur to pay off
the accumulated debt. Or, more simply, the costs of deficit financing
may be less politically salient than the costs of financing with current
taxes.

Id. at 42.
108 Another anecdotal piece of evidence relates to the recent cut to federal income taxes
administered through reducing the amount of required withholding. Many taxpayers apparently scarcely noted their (slightly) increased income (the intended result from a
macroeconomic policy perspective), and not surprisingly most voters did not credit federal
policymakers for a tax cut. Michael Cooper, From Obama, the Tax Cut Nobody Heard Of,
N.Y. Times, Oct. 19, 2010, at Al.
109Logue & Slemrod, note 102, at 849.
107

110Id.
111 As we discuss further in Section II.C., deficit financing may reduce market salience
as well as political salience.
112 Alternatively, financing current expenditures with deficits could be thought of as delaying the need to reduce spending on other programs. We focus on delayed taxation for
ease of exposition.
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The political salience hypothesis of deficit financing thus may operate much like the market salience hypothesis of spotlighting. 113 Both
hypotheses predict that taxpayers discount tax liabilities that are not
imposed until after the time in which the relevant decisions are
made.11 4 In regard to the political salience of deficit financing, this
prediction is based on the separation in time between the current voting decisions and when the future tax liabilities are imposed.
Even if the use of deficit financing does lead voters to support
higher levels for government spending, however, the reason may not
be due to the reduced political salience of the future tax liabilities. If
deficit financing delays the imposition of future tax burdens for a sufficiently long time, it can potentially shift tax burdens to future generations of taxpayers. Deficit financing may thus have intergenerational
distribution effects as well as tax salience effects.11 5 There are also
other nonsalience related reasons that could explain a correlation between deficits and government growth (if they are even correlated). It
is textbook public finance that certain capital projects should be financed over several generations,11 6 and such investments may well
turn out to increase the productivity of future workers, making the
resulting debt burden much more manageable.1 17 For these reasons
and others, empirical studies have yet to produce conclusive evidence
in support of the deficit-financing hypothesis. 18 Nevertheless, many
scholars appear to believe that deficit financing reduces the political
113 See Subsection II.A.1. Alternatively, and more speculatively, the endowment effect
could lead voters to discount future tax liabilities if current taxes are viewed as losses and
future taxes as merely forgone gains. See note 76 (discussing the endowment effect as a
potential explanation for the indirect-taxes hypothesis).
114 For political salience, scholars have typically used the terms "isolation effect" or "focusing effect," in place of "spotlighting," but the underlying idea is the same. See, e.g.,
McCaffery & Baron, note 76, at 290.
115 To the extent that deficit financing merely delays the imposition of a tax burden
without shifting the taxpayers who eventually will need to pay the burden, deficit financing
is properly thought of as a factor affecting the political salience of taxation and can be
analyzed along with the other factors. But to the extent that deficit financing shifts tax
burdens to future generations (or shifts the tax burden amongst existing age cohorts), deficit financing should be thought of as redistributing the tax burden rather than reducing its
political salience. As noted previously, our definition for the political salience of taxation
refers only to how altering the presentation of an individual's tax burden (including shifting the time period in which the tax burden will be incurred) affects the individual's voting
behavior. See notes 12-15 and accompanying text. The distributional impact of shifting tax
burdens among generational cohorts can undoubtedly affect voting behavior-and undoubtedly is important-but is beyond the scope of this Article.
116 E.g., Robert S. Amdursky & Clayton P. Gillette, Municipal Debt Finance Law 10-11
(1992).
117 See, e.g., Neil H. Buchanan, What Do We Owe Future Generations?, 77 Geo. Wash.
L. Rev. 1237, 1265-83 (2009) (offering general arguments that current generations should
look to consume more themselves).
118 Dollery & Worthington, note 64, at 290-93; Oates, note 13, at 71.
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salience of taxation,' 1 9 and there is some suggestive empirical support
121
for this hypothesis, 120 as well as a great deal of anecdotal support.
5.

Sticky Baselines

We use the label "sticky baselines" to group a number of related
sub-hypotheses for how the setting of default fiscal policy outcomes
may influence the direction of actual fiscal policy choices. The stickybaselines hypothesis can be expressed as the prediction that forgone
tax cuts are less politically salient than are actual tax hikes (with the
difference between "forgone tax cuts" and "actual tax hikes" determined by the setting of the baseline for default fiscal policy outcomes). It is useful to begin by discussing the literature on some

discrete instances of this hypothesis, including: (1) the flypaper effect,
(2) bracket creep, (3) income elasticity, and (4) the fiscal-volatility

effect.
a.

The Flypaper Effect

Arthur Okun coined the term "flypaper effect" to describe the notion that the money that governments send out "sticks where it
hits. ' 122 Numerous studies have investigated the flypaper effect with
regard to intergovernmental grants and generally have found that subnational governments "use the grants they receive from the federal
government to increase local spending."'1 23 This finding is potentially
inconsistent with standard economic models based on full political salience. From the perspective of local residents, the receipt of a lump
sum grant from the federal government "is the equivalent of an in-

crease in income. The residents of the local jurisdiction should spend
119 E.g., Shaviro, note 84, at 303 ("In the end, concern about the size of government
provides the most powerful reason for disliking [deficit financing]. [Deficit financing] tends
to increase government spending because of fiscal illusion plus current voters' indifference
to costs that they can pass forward."). But note that Shaviro also emphasizes "the empirical uncertainties" underlying this conclusion, such that "one ultimately must make a leap
of faith about a broad and indeterminate issue." Id.
120 E.g., Jonathan Baron & Edward J. McCaffery, Starving the Beast: The Psychology of
Budget Deficits, in Fiscal Challenges: An Interdisciplinary Approach to Budget Policy 221,
237-38 (Elizabeth Garrett, Elizabeth A. Graddy & Howell E. Jackson eds., 2009). ("[W]e
found that the public does not support deficits ... [y]et the status quo bias will make it
difficult to restore balance once a deficit is created.").
121 E.g., Shaviro, note 84, at 71-78.
122 James R. Hines, Jr. & Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: The Flypaper Effect, 9 J. Econ.
Persp. 217, 218 (1995).
123 Id. ("Numerous studies have investigated the actual effect on spending of various
types of grants to state and local governments. By and large, these studies tend to support
Henry Clay's prediction: spending is stimulated by much more than theory predicts.").
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this increase in income just like any other increase . . . ,"124 That is, if
a local government is spending $2 million on services and then the
federal government gives that government an unrestricted $1 million
grant, then the government should not dramatically increase spending
and should instead return the majority of the extra money to the local
taxpayers. But this is not what is found in these studies; the total size
of local government spending increases, perhaps not by a full million
dollars, but by a much larger amount than would be predicted by
traditional economic models based on full political salience.
Like the other instances of the sticky-baselines hypothesis, the flypaper effect may result from voters focusing on changes to their tax
1 25
liabilities rather than on the absolute levels of their tax liabilities.
In other words, local government taxpayers might be more likely to
notice the federal government distributing money directly to the taxpayers, with the local government subsequently raising taxes in order
to appropriate this money for increased spending, as compared to the
federal government distributing the money directly to the local government so that spending could be increased without the money ever
passing through the hands of the taxpayers. Hence, a plausible political salience explanation for the observed flypaper effect is that the
forgone tax cuts used to finance local government spending when
grants are given directly to local governments are less politically salient than would be the tax hikes needed to fund increased local government spending were the grants instead given to the local
government's taxpayers.
b.

Bracket Creep

Even in the absence of economic growth, inflation can result in progressive income taxes generating more revenue over time due to
"bracket creep" causing taxpayers to move into higher income tax
rate brackets. This effect was thought to be very important in the
United States during the 1970's before the federal income tax brackets
were indexed for inflation as part of the 1981 tax reform. 126 Accord124 Id.
125 See

David Gamage, Preventing State Budget Crises: Managing the Fiscal Volatility
Problem, 98 Cal. L. Rev. 749, 801 (2010) (concluding that "[e]mpirical studies of the 'flypaper effect' buttress these theoretical explanations for why baselines matter"-such as the
theoretical explanation that the endowment effect makes forgone tax cuts less politically
salient).
126 E.g., McCaffery, note 56, at 1894. See generally Economic Recovery Tax Act, H.R.
4242, 97th Cong. § 104 (1981) (enacted). The U.S. federal income tax remains only partially indexed for inflation-most notably, the alternative minimum tax remains
unindexed. E.g., Richard J. Kovach, Technical and Policy Standards for Inflation Adjustments Under the Internal Revenue Code, 33 Okla. City U. L. Rev. 603, 611-12 (2008).
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ing to Michael Graetz, "These inflation adjustments [enacted in the
1981 tax reform] eliminated the sizeable automatic income tax increases that had been produced even at relatively low levels of inflation. The lasting revenue impact of this change is dramatic-far
'127
greater than is generally known.
Bracket creep relates to the sticky-baselines hypothesis to the extent the "automatic income tax increases" generated by inflation have
less political salience than would equivalent tax increases enacted
through tax-rate hikes. Concern over the bracket-creep phenomenon
is thus consistent with the intuition that forgone tax cuts may be less
12 8
politically salient than actual tax hikes.
c.

Income-Elasticity

Variation in the extent to which the revenue generated by a tax instrument increases with economic growth is measured by the "income-

elasticity" of the tax instrument. 129 For instance, income taxes generally have higher income-elasticity than do sales taxes, such that economic growth generally will produce more additional revenues over

time from an income tax than from a sales tax.130 The use of tax instruments with higher income-elasticity consequently generates "automatic tax increases" in a similar fashion to the effect of bracket creep
in the absence of inflation indexing.
It often has been argued that the use of tax instruments with high

income-elasticity tends to increase the size of government over time,
as voters are presumed to be less averse to additional spending financed through the extra revenues generated by high income-elastic-

ity tax instruments, as opposed to raising tax rates to supplement the
lower revenues generated by low income-elasticity tax instruments.'l 3
127 Michael J. Graetz, Tax Policy at the Beginning of the Clinton Administration, 10 Yale
J. on Reg. 561, 563 (1993).
128 See Gamage, note 125, at 796-97 ("After 1981, these 'automatic tax increases' were
abolished, and Congress was no longer able to obtain the same yearly revenue increases
without explicitly voting to raise taxes. The adoption of this new tax baseline through
inflation indexing dramatically altered the dynamics of the federal tax policy debate.").
129 We refer here to the long-term elasticity of revenues with respect to personal income
growth. In some tax policy contexts, such as in regard to state-budget crises and fiscal
volatility problems, it is important to distinguish between long-term and short-term income
elasticity. See, e.g., Mark W. Nichols & Mehmet Serkan Tosun, The Income Elasticity of
Gross Casino Revenues: Short-Run and Long-Run Estimates, 61 Nat'l Tax J. 635, 636-37
(2008); Jon David Vasche & Brad Williams, Revenue Volatility in California, 36 St. Tax
Notes 35, 37 (Apr. 4, 2005); see generally Subsection II.B.5.d.
130 E.g., David Gamage, Managing California's Fiscal Roller Coaster, 49 St. Tax Notes
659, 660 (Sept. 8, 2008) (explaining that income tax revenues vary more with changing
economic growth rates than do most other sources of tax revenue).
131 E.g., Steven M. Sheffrin, Tax Reforms and the Growth of Government, 24 Empirical
Econ. 655, 664 (1999) ("[The increased use of the income tax enacted in California in the
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The higher income-elasticity of income taxation has been cited as a

potential partial cause for California's dramatically increased reliance
on income taxation, as opposed to other state tax instruments, over
time. 32 Both with respect to the impact of income-elasticity on aggregate state spending, and with respect to the increased use of income
taxation as compared to tax instruments with lower income-elasticity,
these arguments appear to assume that forgone tax cuts have less po-

litical salience than actual tax hikes.
d.

The Fiscal-Volatility Effect
In addition to having different long-term elasticities with respect to

personal income growth, tax instruments may also differ in their revenue volatility with respect to shorter-term business cycles. For instance, income tax revenues (and particularly the revenues from

taxing capital gains) are particularly volatile across economic booms
and busts, while property tax revenues tend to remain more constant. 33 Based on the hypothesis that forgone tax cuts are less politically salient than are actual tax hikes, one of us has proposed a
framework for altering the baseline for how states manage the fiscalvolatility effect as a means of mitigating the harm from state budget
134
crises.
e.

Sticky Baselines-Conclusion

There is substantial empirical support for the flypaper effect, 135 and
we view as plausible the other sub-hypotheses of income-elasticity,
bracket creep, and the fiscal-volatility effect. 13 6 Nevertheless, these
1930's] put into place an extremely elastic tax system, thereby permitting a rapid expansion
[I]n retrospect it is clear that the tax
of government in California since the 1930s ....
reform of the early 1930s had the unintended consequence of allowing revenue to grow
more rapidly than under the old tax structure.").
132 Id.
133 David Gamage, Coping Through California's Budget Crises in Light of Proposition
13 and California's Fiscal Constitution, in After the Tax Revolt: California's Proposition
13 Turns 30, at 50, 54-55 (Jack Citrin & Isaac William Martin eds., 2009).
134 Gamage, note 125.
135 Hines & Thaler, note 122, at 218. The evidence is of course not univocal, e.g., Brian
Knight, Endogenous Federal Grants and Crowd-out of State Government Spending: Theory and Evidence from the Federal Highway Aid Program, 92 Am. Econ. Rev. 71, 88
(2002).
136 Analogously, with respect to government spending, it has long been understood that
budgetary baselines matter. There are occasional proposals for zero-base budgeting-for
continually reevaluating the funding for different spending programs, rather than relying
on baselines or on prior year funding. But most scholars of the budgetary process have
concluded that zero-base budgeting is not feasible in practice, such that budgetary baselines are of central importance in determining actual spending priorities. See Aaron
Wildavsky, Budgeting: A Comparative Theory of Budgetary Processes 11 (4th ed. 2002)
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effects may not result from political salience. Consider one competing
explanation, that most democratic political systems are characterized
by numerous veto points, such that the policies supported by the majority of voters (or legislators) do not always become law. 137 Even if
baselines have no influence on how voters perceive the costs of taxation (that is, on the political salience of taxation), default policy outcomes may still be sticky if those who oppose the default outcomes
cannot overcome the veto points preventing policy change.
The empirical literature relevant to the sticky-baselines hypothesis
mostly does not attempt to distinguish explanations related to political
salience from competing explanations-such as those related to veto
points. 138 Yet anecdotal review of how tax politics are discussed suggests that political salience is at least part of the explanation. 139 As
Mathew Rabin has written, "[a] core feature of humans is that we are
highly attuned to changes in our circumstances, not merely the absolute levels. ' 140 And, as one of us concluded in an earlier article,
"[r]arely do politicians try to convince voters about the proper size of
taxation or spending as a percent of GDP. Instead, politicians accuse
their opponents of wanting to 'raise your taxes' and the media dutifully reports the number of times a politician has voted for 'tax cuts'
or 'tax hikes."141
6.

Tax-LabelAversion

In this final political salience hypothesis that we discuss, we group a
number of related sub-hypotheses under the heading of "tax-label
aversion." At least within the current U.S. political context, govern("Incremental calculations, then, proceed from an existing base. By 'base' I refer to commonly held expectations among participants in budgeting that programs will be carried out
at close to the going level of expenditures.").
137 For a more in-depth discussion of this alternative explanation, see Gamage, note 125,
at 798-99. Another competing nonsalience explanation for certain of these effects could be
that voters do perceive the higher tax burden but are happy to pay it in return for increased services. To return to the example from our discussion of the flypaper effect, assume that the voters of the local government want to spend $3 million on services but
cannot-say because they are constrained by interjurisdictional competition. In such a
case, the voters would expect that the redistribution from the higher level of government
would be used towards achieving the optimal amount of government spending.
138 See, e.g., Robert Inman, The Flypaper Effect 220-22 (NBER, Working Paper No.
14579, 2008), available at http://www.nber.org/w14579 (analyzing competing explanations
for the flypaper effect).
139 One of us makes this point elsewhere by reviewing the wording of the No New Taxes
Pledge, the debates over extending the Bush tax cuts, and the debates over indexing Social
Security payments, among others. Gamage, note 125, at 795-98; see also Shaviro, note 66,
at 159 (discussing the indexing of Social Security payments).
140 Matthew Rabin, A Perspective on Psychology and Economics, 46 Eur. Econ. Rev.
657, 662 (2002).
141 Gamage, note 125, at 795.
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ment intervention in the economy that comes in the form of raising
taxes appears to often have more political salience than equivalent (or
at least highly similar) interventions enacted through alternative
142
mechanisms.
We distinguish the tax-label aversion political salience hypothesis
from the related concept of tax-averse preferences (and from the opposed concept of tax-accepting preferences). 143 Tax-averse preferences describe when taxpayers dislike paying taxes more than they
dislike paying other price components, or when taxpayers are otherwise willing to bear more than a dollar in costs in order to avoid paying a dollar in taxes. 144 Both tax-averse preferences and tax-label
45
aversion can be grouped under the general heading of tax aversion.
Only tax-label aversion, however, is properly considered a form of tax
salience, as tax-averse preferences are triggered by substantive characteristics of fiscal policies rather than by variations in their presentation. 146 One can imagine a tax-averse voter not being any more
averse to policies labeled as taxes as compared to similar policies not
labeled as taxes, just as one can imagine a tax-averse voter being even
more averse to any instrument labeled as a tax.
In other words, the tax-label aversion hypothesis is based on the
notion that the mere labeling of a policy as a "tax" can reduce voter
support for the policy (by increasing the political salience of the costs
of the policy). 147 Many have argued that policy interventions that are
essentially equivalent to tax-financed government spending become
more politically palatable if the policy interventions can avoid the
"tax" label. Examples include: (1) taxes versus other extractions, (2)
tax-financed spending versus tax expenditures, and (3) tax-financed
spending versus regulation.
142 Shaviro, note 66, at 12, 23-27 (discussing both the endowment effect and particularities of U.S. antitax sentiments as potential explanations for U.S voters' aversion to policies
that are labeled as "taxes" as compared to similar policies that avoid the "tax" label).
143 For a more in-depth discussion of tax-averse preferences, and of tax aversion more
generally, see Christopher C. Fennell & Lee Anne Fennell, Fear and Greed in Tax Policy:
A Qualitative Research Agenda, 13 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol'y 75 (2003).
144 Id. at 79. Conversely, tax-accepting preferences describe taxpayers who do not view
paying taxes as a pure cost, such as when taxpayers consider government spending as
worth supporting (and taxes as partially akin to a charitable contribution).
145 For empirical studies demonstrating tax aversion, see, e.g., David J. Hardisty, Eric J.
Johnson & Elke U. Weber, A Dirty Word or a Dirty World?: Attribute Framing, Political
Affiliation, and Query Theory, 21 Psychol. Sci. 86, 86-91 (2010); McCaffery & Baron, note
74, at 117-19.
146 More complicated interactions may arise if backlash to a government's use of techniques for reducing political salience results in taxpayer preferences becoming more taxaverse.
147 See Hardisty et al., note 145, at 86 ("The literature on attribute framing suggests that
labels make a big difference .... ").
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Taxes Versus Other Extractions

A few studies have reported evidence that labeling a fiscal extrac-

tion as something other than a "tax" may reduce its political salience. 148 For instance, David Hardisty, Eric Johnson, and Elke Weber

conducted three experiments comparing their experimental subjects'
reactions to "carbon taxes" as opposed to "carbon offsets. ' 149 They
found that subjects identifying as Republicans were significantly more

opposed to the "carbon taxes" than to the equivalent "carbon offsets.

' 150

There is thus at least anecdotal support for the notion that

labeling extractions as "taxes" can sometimes result in at least some
voters becoming more opposed to the policies than were they instead

labeled as alternatives such as "offsets," "fees," "penalties," or "service charges.'
b.

151

Tax-Financed Spending Versus Tax Expenditures

The idea that tax expenditures have less political salience than taxfinanced government spending has played a central role in the tax legal literature. 152 Although the definition of "tax expenditures" is
somewhat controversial, the term generally is used to refer to tax preferences-such as tax credits, deductions, or exclusions-used to encourage certain taxpayer behaviors or to otherwise regulate economic
148 See generally Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Cognitive Theory and the Delivery of Welfare
Benefits, 40 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 253 (2009).
149 Hardisty et al., note 145, at 87-91.
150 Interestingly, subjects identifying as Democrats responded similarly to the tax and
offset frames. Id. at 91.
151E.g., Matthew Saltmarsh, Nicked at Every Turn, N.Y. Times, Mar. 18, 2010, at BI
(reporting that "analysts say" that government charges levied on "services once provided
free" for the purpose of raising revenues "are generally easier to enact" than are tax increases); Colin H. McCubbins & Mathew D. McCubbins, Proposition 13 and the California
Fiscal Shell Game, 2 Cal. J. Pol. & Pol'y 1, 20 (2010) ("[A] subtler substitute for property
taxes has grown in popularity over the past three decades. Charges and fees have become
an integral part of the California budgetary landscape ....").
For another empirical study on this question, McCaffery and Baron conducted a laboratory-type experiment comparing government extractions labeled as "taxes" to equivalentsized direct payments (or "service charges"). They found that their experimental subjects
were more accepting of "taxes" for financing expenditures like fire, education, and Social
Security (all of which are currently tax-financed in the United States), but were more opposed to "taxes" for services like phone services and theft insurance. McCaffery & Baron,
note 74, at 117-19.
152 Edward A. Zelinsky, Do Tax Expenditures Create Framing Effects? Volunteer
Firefighters, Property Tax Exemptions, And The Paradox Of Tax Expenditure Analysis, 24
Va. Tax Rev. 797, 801, 826 (2005) (noting that "[f]ew academic doctrines have achieved the
success of tax expenditure analysis," but concluding that understanding tax expenditures
"has had no apparent impact on public policy. Tax expenditures continue to proliferate
because they create framing effects.").
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activity. 153 According to Edward Kleinbard, "our extraordinary reliance on tax expenditures explains the central paradox of the American tax system, which is why the United States is a low-tax country
with relatively high marginal tax rates. More fundamentally, tax expenditures dissolve the boundaries between government revenues and
154
government spending.
That tax expenditures have less political salience than tax-financed
spending is often inferred from the degree to which the U.S. government relies on tax expenditures. 155 According to the Congressional
Research Service's calculations, the sum of U.S. tax expenditures
equaled $1.2 trillion in 2008 156-an amount larger than both the revenue raised by the individual income tax and the sum total of all federal
discretionary spending1 57 In addition to this inferential support, an
experimental study by Edward Zelinsky found that survey respondents significantly preferred to pay firefighters through tax expenditures rather than through direct spending.158 In a similar
experimental study of negative tax expenditures, David Walker found
that his survey respondents were more willing to support denying tax
deductions for "excessive" executive pensions as compared to imposing direct penalties.1 59 In an even broader study based on 498 anonymous respondents, Jake Haselswerdt and Brandon Bartels found "that
the delivery mechanism of a government program can have a dramatic
effect ...

In general, Americans seem to be much more favorably

disposed toward government interventions through the tax code than
through more direct channels. ' 160 Although there has been relatively

153 Daniel N. Shaviro, Rethinking Tax Expenditures and Fiscal Language, 57 Tax L. Rev.
187, 187 (2004).
154 Edward D. Kleinbard, The Congress Within the Congress: How Tax Expenditures
Distort Our Budget and Our Political Processes, 36 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. 1, 3 (2010).
155 E.g., Kornhauser, note 148, at 264.
156 Staff of S. Comm. on the Budget, 110th Cong., Tax Expenditures: Compendium of
Background Material on Individual Provisions 13 (Comm. Print. 2008).
157 Kleinbard, note 154, at 13 (citing Cong. Budget Office, A Preliminary Analysis of the
President's Budget and an Update of CBO's Budget and Economic Outlook 3 tbl.1-2
(2009)).
158 Zelinsky, note 152, at 815-21.
159 David I. Walker, Suitable for Framing: Business Deductions in a Net Income Tax
System, 52 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1247, 1255, 1269-71 (2011).
160 Jake Haselswerdt & Brandon L. Bartels, Comparing Attitudes Toward Tax Breaks
and Spending Programs: Evidence from a Survey Experiment, at *20 (unpublished manuscript on file with the Tax Law Review). Note that this study was based on asking respondents about the mortgage interest deduction, a major tax expenditure, and the preference
for tax expenditures was more pronounced among the respondents that were classified as
economically conservative.
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161
little empirical study of the political salience of tax expenditures,

there are still grounds for inferring that tax expenditures may often
have less political salience than tax-financed direct spending.
c.

Tax-Financed Spending Versus Regulation

Like tax expenditures, regulations can also substitute for tax-financed government spending. 162 For instance, many Democrats began to support mandates that employers provide health insurance to
employees because the Democrats' favored policy of government-provided healthcare was not considered politically feasible. 163 Similarly,

some environmentalists have called for climate regulations as a more
politically feasible alternative to carbon taxes. 164 Regulations can impose real burdens on taxpayers, just as can taxation. As with taxation,
the parties on whom the regulations are initially imposed may not
bear the final burden, which depends on the economic incidence of
the regulations. Nevertheless, voters may not appreciate the burdens
imposed by regulation to the same degree as they would the burdens

imposed by taxes, such that using regulation as a substitute for tax165
financed spending may have less political salience.

d.

Tax-Label Aversion-Conclusion

Whereas most of the political salience hypotheses suggest mechanisms whereby governments might reduce the political salience of taxation, the tax-label aversion hypothesis suggests alternatives to
"taxation" for enacting government policies. To the extent these alternatives are available as effective substitutes to taxation, restrictions
on governments' abilities to raise "taxes" cannot meaningfully reduce
the "size of government" nor prevent government actors from enact161 See id at *4-8, 20 (summarizing other related studies, but maintaining that "[t]o our
knowledge, this is the first experimental study to document the impact of delivery mechanism on citizens' reactions to a government policy").
162 Mark Kelman, Strategy or Principle? The Choice Between Regulation and Taxation
1-5, 77-78 (1999); Richard A. Posner, Taxation by Regulation, 2 Bell J. Econ. & Mgmt. Sci.
22, 41-45 (1971).
163 David A. Rochefort, The Pragmatic Appeal of Employment-Based Health Care Reform, 18 J. Health Pol. Pol'y & L. 683, 690-91 (1993).
164 See Jonathan Chait, Poll Shows Support for EPA Regulation, The New Republic,
Aug. 31, 2010, http://www.tnr.com/blog/jonathan-chait/77335/poll-shows-support-eparegulation.
165 See Shaviro, note 66, at 27-28 (discussing minimum wage laws as an alternative to
taxation); see also Geoffrey Brennan & James M. Buchanan, The Power To Tax: Analytical Foundations of a Fiscal Constitution 166 (1980) ("It is relatively easy to envisage a
federal budget making up no more than 20 percent of GNP that would reflect more interference with personal liberties than an alternative budget of 40 percent of GNP, but with
substantially less direct regulation.").
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ing their policy goals. Of course, there are limits to the extent to
which these alternatives can substitute for tax-financed direct spending and there might be good reasons other than political salience to
prefer these other mechanisms. 166 Because there also can be other

reasons to prefer these alternatives, we again know of no study that
convincingly disentangles the supposed lower political salience of
these alternatives to show that their use increases the size of govern-

ment. Nevertheless, no normative discussion of political salience can
be complete without considering alternatives to extractions labeled as
"taxes."
C.

Analyzing How Market Salience and Political
Salience May Interact

A key thesis of this Article is that there are multiple dimensions to

tax salience. Tax-design techniques that reduce market salience may
increase political salience, and vice versa. This point has been occasionally noted by prior scholars.' 67 Yet many commentators-in particular tax-legal scholars-persist in viewing tax salience primarily as a
unitary concept, analytically treating tax instruments with high sali-

ence in one domain, and low salience in another, as rare exceptions. 68
Indeed, by treating tax-salience as a unitary concept, at least one
commentator has alleged that policymakers face a specified tax-salience tradeoff: less market salience, which is considered desirable, can
only be achieved with less political salience, which is considered undesirable. 169 In Part III we agree with the conclusion that reducing market salience should generally be considered desirable. In Part IV we
dispute the notion that reducing political salience should be considered harmful. Regardless, we emphasize in this Section that policy166 See, e.g., Shaviro, note 66, at 11 (arguing that "[o]ur structural fiscal language, rather
than being dictated from on high by Big Brother, involves formal rules of the game that
participants can manipulate but not openly flout. It tilts and constrains real policy choices,
and induces political actors to befuddle themselves even as they labor to befuddle constituencies whose support they need."); David A. Weisbach & Jacob Nussim, The Integration of
Tax and Spending Programs, 113 Yale L.J. 955, 957-61 (2004) (arguing that tax expenditures may sometimes be the most efficient means to fund government initiatives).
167 E.g., Finkelstein, note 4, at 972 (first misleadingly discussing tax salience as a single
concept with respect to both "economic and political decisions," but then allowing in her
model for tax salience to differ between the time of consumption and the time of voting);
Schenk, note 5, at 21-22.
168 E.g., Nussim, note 35, at 229-31 (citing the literature on political salience-that is,
fiscal illusion-as support for the market-salience-related behavior of consumer undervaluation of tax-exclusive prices); Galle, note 14, at 109-11 (analyzing an alleged conflict between "democracy" and "welfare").
169 E.g., Galle, note 14, at 109-11. Note that although we agree with Galle's conclusion
that it is generally desirable to reduce market salience, this conclusion contrasts with much
of the recent literature. See Sections III.B and III.C.
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makers generally do not face this form of a tax-salience tradeoff-the
choice to use tax instruments with low market salience does not necessarily require also choosing tax instruments with low political salience.
Consider Chetty, Looney, and Kroft's well-known study of the market salience of U.S. retail sales taxes. 170 They found that grocery store
customers do not fully factor retail sales taxes into their purchasing
decisions when these taxes are not included in the prices posted on the
store's aisles, even when the grocery store customers appeared to be
fully aware of the sales taxes and their effects on the goods' final
prices.17 1 What caused the retail sales taxes to have low market salience in their study was thus presumably not a factor of whether the
consumers knew about the tax in a manner that would allow for informed voting, but appeared instead to be a result of the tax information not being included in the posted prices that the consumers relied
on when making their market purchasing decisions. Notably, Richard
Bird has argued that this very feature of retail sales taxes makes them
especially politically salient:
RSTs such as those in Ontario (as well as four other provinces and most US states) are invariably stated as a separate
explicit charge imposed on the posted price when the consumer arrives at the cash register. While this process is no
doubt both cumbersome and often unwelcome-no one ever
has the correct change ready!-the very fact that it is annoying may perhaps be considered good for democracy, if one
believes that citizens should be fully aware of the cost of government. On the other hand, such transparency clearly
makes it more difficult to raise the tax rate because everyone
172
is instantly aware of any increase.
173
Now consider the indirect taxes political salience hypothesis.
Even were consumers completely unaware of the existence of indirect
tax instruments-like most VATs-the costs of these tax instruments
are still typically incorporated into the prices vendors post on store
aisles. 174 The intuition that voters discount the costs of indirect taxes
because the voters do not remit these taxes themselves does not imply
that consumers do not respond to the costs of indirect taxes when
170

Chetty et al., note 6.

171 Id. at 1165-66.

note 68, at 68.
Subsection II.B.1.
174 Chetty et al., note 6, at 1169 ("Taxes levied on producers are more likely to be included in posted prices than taxes levied on consumers because producers must actively
'shroud' a tax levied on them in order to reduce its salience.").
172 Bird,
173 See
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making purchasing decisions. How tax costs are perceived when voting can differ from how tax costs are perceived when making market
purchases.
To generalize, political salience is lessened when voters underestimate the tax components of market prices. The use of indirect taxes is
hypothesized to reduce political salience by making it more difficult
for voters to differentiate the price effects of taxation on the cost of
purchased goods from the nontax prices of those goods. But market
salience is only reduced when consumers underestimate post-tax
prices. Making it more difficult to distinguish between the tax components of a price and the nontax components of a price should thus not
affect market salience, as the post-tax price remains unchanged. The
indirect-taxes hypothesis predicts that the use of indirect taxes reduces
political salience, but-at least as compared to retail sales taxesChetty, Looney, and Kroft's results suggest that the use of indirect
taxes should increase market salience. 175
Within the market salience literature, the spotlighting hypothesis
has received the most empirical support. 176 Nearly all of the studies
demonstrating the spotlighting hypothesis have involved a separation
in time between when market decisions are made and when the tax
components of a price are assessed. 177 Yet voting decisions are not
usually made at the same point in time as are market decisions. 78
The political salience equivalent of spotlighting behavior should thus
only reduce political salience when tax assessments are delayed until
after voting (or perhaps scheduled long before voting). When tax assessment occurs after market decision-making, but prior to voting decisions, spotlighting should only reduce market salience, not political
salience. 179 Consider a stylized version of Ott and Andrus' finding
175See notes 20-23 and accompanying text.
176 See Subsection II.A.1.

Id.
178 We are grateful to Ilan Benshalom for pointing out that our discussion glosses over
ways in which the distinction between market salience and political salience can be
mapped onto the distinction between private and public goods. We use a narrow definition
for political salience in this Article in order to keep our analysis tractable. We appreciate
the need for further work to improve our understanding of the nature of political salience.
Nevertheless, the distinction between private and public goods cannot capture the entire
difference between market salience and political salience, because of the point we make
here about the role of timing. Market salience and political salience are distinct in part
because of when these kinds of decisions are made and this issue of timing is only distantly
related to the nature of private versus public goods.
179 Moreover, delaying tax assessment until after market decision-making, but prior to
political decision-making, may increase political salience due to the triggering of an endowment effect. See text accompanying note 76; see also Sherman, note 70, at 843 ("In theory,
members of the public may want to know about the taxes they are paying; in practice,
177

however, they do not want to be reminded of it by paying a higher-than-advertised price

every time they make a purchase.").
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concerning the personal property tax on automobiles.1 80 At the time
of purchase, consumers do not take into account their future tax liability because these taxes will be levied in the future, and thus these
taxes have low market salience. As voters, however, these consumers
do receive personal property tax bills, and, assuming these bills arrive
before an election (as they must since assessed annually), personal
property taxes would seem to have higher political salience-or at any
rate the level of political salience of these taxes is not directly related
to their market salience. To be sure, significantly delaying tax assessment-such as, perhaps, through certain types of deficit financingmight reduce both market salience and political salience.18 1 But most
spotlighting techniques for reducing market salience do not involve
such long-time delays, and thus should not reduce political salience.
Indeed, we might expect tax-design techniques that reduce market
salience by inducing spotlighting behavior to generally increase political salience. If taxpayers fail to fully consider a tax when making market decisions-because the tax price is not assessed until after the
market decision-the taxpayers may become all the more irked when
they later have to pay the taxes. More formally, we might imagine
that taxpayers perceive taxes that are not assessed until after a market
decision as losses or as nonvoluntary extractions-thus triggering the
endowment effect-but that taxes assessed at the time of market decision-making are understood to be part of the costs of making the market decision.' 8 2 This logic may explain why the estate tax appears to
18 3
have high political salience, but low market salience.
To be sure, declines in both forms of tax salience can be correlated.
For instance, we might expect the use of phase-outs for tax credits and
deductions to reduce both market salience and political salience.
When tax credits and deductions phase out as taxable income increases, this raises the effective tax rates faced by taxpayers in the
phase-out range. To the extent taxpayers focus on their statutory tax
180 See Ott & Andrus, note 30.

181The spotlighting hypothesis thus runs directly counter to Barro's Ricardian Equivalence hypothesis. See generally Robert J. Barro, Are Government Bonds Net Wealth?, 82
J. Pol. Econ. 1095 (1974) (hypothesizing that there is no difference between debt and tax
financing for a given amount of public expenditure). That most scholars appear to have
rejected the Ricardian Equivalence hypothesis supports the inference that scholars tend to
accept the intuitions underlying the spotlighting market-salience hypothesis. See Shaviro,
note 84, at 66-78, 145 (discussing the Ricardian equivalence hypothesis and concluding that
it is implausible in its strong form).
182See Shaviro, note 66, at 23-25.
183See Lee Ann Fennell, Death, Taxes, and Cognition, 81 N.C. L. Rev. 567, 567 (2003)
("The Article is structured around two puzzles that have been frequently identified in the
estate tax literature: first, why popular opposition to the tax is so great ... and second,
why those whose estates are likely to be subject to the tax often do not take advantage of
the opportunity to lighten the transfer tax burden .... ").
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rates, phase-outs could reduce both the market salience and the political salience of taxation. 84 Similarly, we might predict that the Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT) reduces both market salience and
political salience in the same manner as might phase-outs. To the extent that taxpayers focus on their statutory tax rates under the regular
income tax-rather than on their effective tax rates as modified by the
AMT-then the AMT could reduce both the market and political sali185
ence of taxation.
The existing literatures on market salience and political salience are
both tentative. Considerably more empirical work will be needed to
confidently assess how market salience and political salience may interact. Nevertheless, it should be clear that market salience and political salience are distinct phenomena. Tax-design techniques that
reduce one form of tax salience may increase salience along the other
dimension. This relationship is perhaps most clear when comparing
indirect taxes and retail sales taxes, yet we expect that market salience
and political salience work in opposite directions with respect to many
(if not most) tax-design techniques. Although some tax-design mechanisms may reduce both market salience and political salience, we see
no reason to expect that market salience and political salience work
together more often than they work apart.
D.

Understandingthe Multiple Dimensions of Tax
Salience-Conclusion

Tax salience is a messy concept. In this Part, we reviewed the existing empirical literature on both the market salience and the political
salience of taxation. The empirical literature on market salience remains small, although it is expanding rapidly. The literature finds support for the spotlighting and (to a lesser extent) the ironing
hypotheses for market salience. However, the literature does not yet
offer clear predictions for how these hypotheses relate to real-world
tax instruments. In particular, the literature does not fully analyze potential limiting factors to these hypotheses and thus cannot determine
184 This argument regarding phase-outs is a variant of the spotlighting market-salience
hypothesis insofar as taxpayers underestimate their effective marginal tax rates when making market decisions. The argument is also a variant of the tax-system complexity politicalsalience hypothesis insofar as phase-outs lead taxpayers to underestimate their effective
tax burdens when making voting decisions.
185 Note that these examples are only meant to illustrate how market salience and political salience might be correlated. The actual impact of phase-outs or the AMT on either
form of tax salience is far from certain. For instance, the AMT could have high political
salience if voters become irked by surprising increases to their income tax liabilities and
then express their anger in the voting booth.
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whether increased use of techniques for reducing market salience
would have the intended effect.
Existing empirical studies of the major political salience hypotheses
are even less conclusive. We discussed common claims regarding political salience made within the literature and indicated that many of
these claims strike us as at least somewhat plausible, whether because
of suggestive empirical evidence or anecdotal evidence. However, as
with market salience, a number of limiting factors may restrict (or
even counteract) attempts to reduce political salience within realworld contexts.
Finally, we argued that market salience and political salience should
be thought of as distinct concepts. In particular, we argued that the
spotlighting hypothesis for market salience and the indirect-taxes hypothesis for political salience tend to work in opposite directions. Although some tax design techniques undoubtedly reduce both market
salience and political salience, we expect that these two concepts work
in opposite directions more often than not.
We have not of course reviewed all of the empirical findings potentially related to tax salience. In particular, we have not analyzed
sources of voter confusion regarding taxation that governments cannot readily exploit to manipulate taxpayers' perceptions of tax
costs. 18 6 The salience of taxation may also change over time, as the
structure of markets evolve or as taxpayers become accustomed to
18 7
new price-presentation techniques.
It may thus be tempting to conclude that policy debates should ignore intuitions about tax salience until (or unless) these intuitions receive more satisfactory empirical support. Yet it must be recognized
that intuitions about tax salience already significantly influence debates over tax policy. 188 So long as important political actors (and
perhaps also the voters on whose support they depend) make tax policy decisions based on naive intuitions about tax salience, scholars
must continue to analyze these intuitions based on whatever evidence
can be mustered-no matter how inconclusive the evidence might be.

186 For instance, as we discuss further in notes 277-84 and accompanying text, empirical
studies on "the metric effect" suggest that voters perceive the costs of taxation differently
depending on whether tax information is displayed in dollar amounts or as percentages.
187 See Campbell, at 28 (reporting that voter attitudes about the U.S. federal income tax
have changed over time).
188 See, e.g., text accompanying notes 3, 80, and 97 (citing to a number of strong political
positions advocated for based on the political salience hypotheses discussed in Section
1I.B).
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ANALYZING THE NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS OF MARKET SALIENCE

In this Part, our second essay, we argue that it is generally desirable
to reduce the market salience of taxation. Our argument contrasts
with the conclusions reached in much of the recent literature. 18 9 In
particular, many contend that the advantages from reducing market
salience may be overwhelmed by harms created from distortionary income effects. 190 Scholars also frequently cite concerns related to externalities and distribution. 191 We argue that all three of these
concerns have been overstated. To be clear, we agree with other recent scholars that these concerns are potentially important. Nevertheless, we argue that in most circumstances these concerns should be
overpowered by the benefits produced from decreasing market salience. We thus support a general presumption in favor of reducing the
market salience of taxation.
Readers versed in public finance economics can probably anticipate
the primary benefits generated by reducing market salience. Taxes
decrease economic welfare to the extent that market participants perceive the costs imposed by taxation and alter their market decisions in
order to avoid those costs. Hence, inducing taxpayers to ignore some
of the costs of taxation when making market decisions-that is, by
reducing market salience-alleviates the economic harm caused by
raising tax revenues. Perhaps because the advantages of reducing
market salience are so readily understood, most of the recent normative literature on market salience has focused on questioning this simple case for reducing market salience. 192 We conclude that the simple
normative case for reducing market salience will usually be robust to
all three of the potential limitations discussed in the literature.
Nevertheless, we should emphasize that not all mechanisms for reducing market salience are normatively attractive; as in most things,
the ends do not justify all potential means. For instance, some techniques for reducing market salience may involve making tax assessments more complex. To the extent additional complexity poses real
costs for taxpayers who must calculate their taxes, these costs must be
weighed against any social welfare advantages that result from reducing market salience. 93 The argument we present in this Part for why
189

See, e.g., Chetty et al., note 6, at 1173-76.

190 See id.

191See, e.g., id., at 1164; Galle, note 14, at 61, 78, 100-03; Nussim, note 35, at 244-47, 24953.
192Establishing a scholarly reputation, after all, requires making nonobvious
contributions.
193To the extent that additional complexity causes some taxpayers to forgo calculating
their post-tax prices-thereby reducing the market salience of the tax instrument-the impact of the additional complexity on compliance costs is not straightforward. On the one
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it is generally desirable to reduce the market salience of taxation does
not account for any negative side effects created by specific mechanisms for reducing market salience. 194 Instead, this Part takes as its
question whether the end of reducing market salience should in and of
itself be considered normatively attractive. This abstract inquiry is analytically prior to consideration of specific means of reducing market
195
salience.
Moreover, we focus our arguments in this Part on evaluating the
consequences of reducing market salience. We do not consider
whether there is anything inherently wrong with reducing market salience even if doing so generates desirable consequences. We do not
believe there is anything inherently wrong with reducing market salience, but we leave evaluation of that question for future research.
As a final cautionary note, we should reemphasize that we do not
mean to imply that governments actually can reduce the market salience of taxation. Our arguments in this Part are entirely theoretical.
If future research provides governments with tools capable of clearly
reducing market salience, we argue for a general presumption in favor
of employing those tools.
A.

The Simple Case for Reducing Market Salience

Most forms of taxation affect ("distort") taxpayer behavior, result-

ing in what economists refer to as "excess burden" or "deadweight
hand, if some taxpayers continue to calculate post-tax prices, additional complexity raises
the compliance costs faced by those taxpayers. On the other hand, if the additional complexity causes other taxpayers to forgo calculating post-tax prices, the additional complexity eliminates the compliance costs that these taxpayers would have incurred in calculating
their post-tax prices under less complex tax systems. How these factors balance out will
differ depending on the details of the tax instruments in question.
194 As another potential negative side effect, some scholars have suggested that certain
mechanisms for reducing market salience may produce "psychic costs" to the extent that
taxpayers would prefer an easy aggregation of tax costs and nontax costs. See, e.g., Bird,
note 68, at 67-70 (reporting that Canadians express displeasure at having to pay taxes at
store registers that are not posted on the prices displayed on store aisles); Amotz Morag,
On Taxes and Inflation 21 (1965) ("An important factor in the realities of the limits of
taxation are the psychic costs of paying tax, costs which politicians will carefully heed because they are clearly relevant to the prospects of re-election.").
195 As a further related caveat, we note that our argument in favor of reducing market
salience assumes that market salience would be lessened equally across all relevant transactions. It might not be desirable to reduce market salience with respect to only some taxrelevant transactions. For example, if market salience were reduced only for grocery store
purchases, but not for other purchases, this might induce taxpayers to increase their grocery store consumption at the expense of consumption for which tax prices remain more
market salient. Yet most mechanisms for reducing market salience should affect the majority of taxed transactions rather than just a small subset. Hence, we view this concern
more as a caveat than as a central limitation to the simple case for reducing market salience. (We thank Eric Zolt for bringing this concern to our attention).
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lOSS."'1 96 As a starting point, it is typical to envision the economic de197
cisions taxpayers would have made in a hypothetical pretax world.
The next step is to calculate how taxpayers deviate from this behavior
as a result of taxation. For instance, if there is a tax on one good (for
example, hamburgers), but not on another substitute good (for example, hot dogs), then Jane Taxpayer might shift her consumption from
hamburgers to hot dogs even if she would have preferred hamburgers
in the absence of taxation. To the extent Jane Taxpayer continues to
consume hamburgers-while paying the tax-the tax merely transfers
resources from Jane to the government (which then may be transferred back to Jane or to other taxpayers through government spending). But to the extent that Jane shifts her consumption from
hamburgers to hot dogs, Jane loses utility equal to the amount by
which she would have preferred the hamburgers over the hot dogs,
and the government derives no revenue from Jane's consumption of
the untaxed hot dogs. The loss to taxpayer utility that results from
taxpayers shifting away from taxed activities for the purpose of paying
less in taxes, is the excess burden or deadweight loss.
Generalizing from this simple example, a similar logic applies to
taxes on income, under the assumption that leisure generally cannot
be taxed, and to any other taxes that can be avoided by engaging in
less of the taxed activities. For example, sales taxes generate excess
burden to the extent taxpayers reduce their retail purchases, capital
income taxes generate excess burden to the extent taxpayers reduce
their savings, and corporate income taxes generate excess burden to
the extent individuals shift their investments out of the corporate
form.1 98 Again, the key insight is that when taxation deters individuals from engaging in taxed activities, the individuals derive less utility
while the government receives no additional revenues.
Our discussion so far has considered only "substitution effects"shifts in taxpayer behavior that occur due to taxes altering the relative
prices of goods or activities. In addition to substitution effects, taxpayer behavior may also adjust through "income effects"-shifts in
taxpayer behavior that occur due to taxation reducing the taxpayers'
overall budgets. 19 9 For example, if the imposition of a new income tax
reduces the amount of money a taxpayer has to spend on consumer
196Slemrod & Bakija, note 77, at 144.
197The following discussion roughly follows Harvey Rosen & Ted Gayer, Public Finance
331-52 (8th ed. 2008). Similar accounts can be found in most other introductory texts on
public economics. See, e.g., Gruber, note 72, at 35-37, 590-601; Bernard Salani6, The Economics of Taxation 35-44 (2003).
198 Of course, the listed tax instruments can also generate excess burden by affecting
taxpayer behavior on margins other than those mentioned.
199See Rosen & Gayer, note 197, at 337-38.
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goods, she may reduce her consumption of luxury items (for example,
designer clothes and entertainment) more than of necessary items (for
example, food and more basic clothing), even if the tax affects the
prices of all goods equally.
When tax instruments are fully market-salient, whether the tax instruments produce income effects depends on what the governments
do with their collected tax revenues. For instance, if a government
collects $100 from a taxpayer in aggregate taxes, and then immediately returns the $100 to the taxpayer as a cash payment (or gives to
the taxpayer exactly what she would have purchased anyway), there
would be no income effects. The taxpayer's aggregate income would
be identical both before and after the counteracting tax and cash payment. Although governments use revenues for purposes other than
cash payments, the more general point remains that the net effect of
taxation on a taxpayer's budget depends on how the government uses
the tax revenue. 20 0 In order to factor out considerations related to
governments' use of tax revenues, economists frequently measure the
distortionary impact of a tax instrument by comparing the behavioral
effects of the tax instrument to the behavioral effects that would result
if the government instead collected the same revenues through a lump
sum tax201 and then immediately returned those revenues to the taxpayers through direct cash payments. Through this mechanismknown as "equivalent variation"-it is possible to isolate the substitution effects of a tax instrument from the income effects. 20 2 For many
questions of tax policy, only the substitution effects are normatively
relevant when measuring excess burden, as income effects depend on
203
how the governments use collected tax revenues.
200 See generally id. If government spending is wasteful, then net taxing and spending
will reduce taxpayers' budgets. Conversely, if government spending is more valuable than
forgone private consumption (for example, if the government spending provides valuable
public goods), net taxing and spending may increase taxpayers' budgets. Even in this latter
case, however, there may be income effects if the government spending is not a perfect
substitute for the forgone private consumption (or if it is not perceived as such by taxpayers). Moreover, if net taxes and spending have distributional effects, the resulting income
effects may differ among taxpayers.
201 A "lump sum tax" is defined as a tax instrument "whose value is independent of the
individual's behavior." Id. at 334.
202 The technique for measuring excess burden using "equivalent variation" as described
here follows Chetty et al., note 6, at 1170-75, and Alan J. Auerbach, The Theory of Excess
Burden and Optimal Taxation, in 1 Handbook of Public Economics 61, 63-73 (Alan
Auerbach & Martin Feldstein eds., 1985). For a more thorough discussion of this topic
targeted toward lawyers, see David Weisbach, Line Drawing, Doctrine, and Efficiency in
the Tax Law, 84 Cornell L. Rev. 1627, 1652-55 (1999).
203 See Rosen & Gayer, note 197, at 338. To be more precise, although income effects
do have normative relevance, the analytic technique of factoring out income effects
through equivalent variation allows a policy analyst to make normative statements about
taxation without the need to evaluate how tax revenues are used. This approach is some-
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The above discussion summarizes the standard economics approach
for measuring excess burden (aka, deadweight loss) when tax instruments are assumed to be fully market salient. 204 As we elaborate momentarily, income effects may have additional implications for excess
burden when tax instruments are not fully market salient. 20 5 But first,
the impact of market salience on substitution effects supports a simple
normative case for reducing the market salience of taxation.
By definition, reducing the market salience of a tax instrument lessens the substitution effects that result from the tax instrument, as the
concept of market salience refers to the extent to which taxpayers factor tax prices into their market decisions. 20 6 Replacing a higher market-salience tax instrument with an otherwise identical lower marketsalience alternative thus alleviates the excess burden caused by substitution effects.2 0 7 Intuitively, if the market-price effects of a tax become less salient, then the tax should have less distortionary impact
on taxpayers' market behavior. Indeed, Raj Chetty has developed
formulas for measuring the excess burden of low market-salience
taxes by comparing the differences in how individuals respond to tax
208
prices as compared to nontax prices.
Consequently, economic theory provides a useful baseline for determining full or neutral market salience. When comparing any two tax
instruments, we can say that the instrument for which the tax costs are
most apparent has higher salience. But to say that a tax instrument
has "low" or "high" salience we need a baseline for what is meant by
"full" or "neutral" salience. For market salience, we can use as a
baseline taxpayers' perceptions of the nontax costs of making market
decisions. 20 9 When taxpayers evaluate tax costs the same as they do
nontax costs (for example, the prices charged by private-sector ventimes called using "compensated responses," "compensated demand curves," or "compensated elasticities." See id. All of these terms refer to the approach of factoring out income
effects to focus solely on substitution effects.

204 See Chetty et al., note 6, at 1173.
205 See Section III.B.
206 See Section II.A.

207See Chetty et al., note 6, at 1173 ("As the degree of attention to taxes rises, excess
burden rises at a quadratic rate .... ); Galle, note 14, at 62 ("[I]f the size of the behavioral
distortion is related to the size of the tax bill, then a diminished awareness of the bill's
economic burdens should also diminish the distortion. It follows that an unnoticed tax is,

like a tax on highly inelastic behaviors, potentially more efficient than more obvious
excises.").
208 See Chetty et al., note 6, at 1171-72.
209 Not all nontax costs need be equally market salient, particularly to the extent that
private-sector vendors engage in price-shrouding practices. Consequently, it will not always be clear which nontax costs should be used as the baseline for determining the mar-

ket salience of taxation. But for most normative questions regarding market salience, this
level of precision should not be necessary, and perceptions of tax costs can be compared to
a baseline of a rough average of perceptions of nontax costs.
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dors), we can say that the tax costs are fully market salient. Hence, a
tax instrument has "low" market salience when taxpayers discount its
tax costs as compared to nontax costs, and a tax instrument has "high"
market salience when taxpayers weigh its tax costs more heavily than
they do nontax costs. 2 10 When tax instruments are fully market-salient, taxpayers generally respond identically to both tax prices and
nontax prices. 211 Conversely, a completely non-market-salient tax instrument would result in no excess burden from substitution effects,
212
being equivalent in this regard to a lump sum tax.
The standard economic notion that substitution effects result in normatively undesirable excess burden thus supports a simple case for
reducing the market salience of taxation. By alleviating the tendency
for taxpayers to shift away from taxed activities, low market-salience
taxes can raise revenue while producing less deadweight loss. Were
substitution effects the only concern, this simple case for reducing
market salience would be quite rigorous from an economic perspective. The remainder of this Part evaluates the robustness of the simple
case to concerns beyond substitution effects.
B.

The Impact of DistortionaryIncome Effects

Of the primary limitations to the simple case for reducing market
salience, the problem of distortionary income effects has received the
greatest attention in the recent literature. 2t 3 In the following discussion, we argue that concerns over distortionary income effects have
been overemphasized; we argue that distortionary income effects are
only likely to defeat the simple case for reducing market salience
under a limited set of conditions-namely, either when taxes are imposed on irregular purchases made by credit-constrained taxpayers, or
when there are long time delays between market decisions and tax
assessments.
We do not mean to suggest that distortionary income effects are not
important. We only mean to argue that the recent literature has overstated concerns related to distortionary income effects. We conclude
that, for most mechanisms for reducing market salience, any harm
210 Of course, there often will be heterogeneity in how individual taxpayers respond to
tax costs as compared to nontax costs. To keep the scope of our discussion manageable, we
mostly gloss over heterogeneity by discussing the salience of tax instruments based on taxpayer reactions in the aggregate.
211 See Chetty et al., note 6, at 1171. An exception to this rule is when taxpayers have
tax-averse or tax-accepting preferences. See Subsection II.B.5. Following the approach of
most optimal tax models, Chetty's formulas assume away the possibility of tax-averse or
tax-accepting preferences.
212 See Chetty et al., note 6, at 1173.
213 See, e.g., id. at 1173-76.
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caused by distortionary income effects should be overwhelmed by the
benefits resulting from reduced substitution effects.
1.

The Problem of DistortionaryIncome Effects

As we noted previously, in standard optimal tax models wherein
taxes are assumed to be fully market salient, income effects typically
are factored out because decreases to individuals' budget capacities
214
are counteracted by increases to the government's budget capacity.
When taxes reduce individuals' budgets, the standard models assume
that the individuals optimally allocate their (now smaller) after-tax
budgets across goods and time periods. 2 15 Individuals, however, may
not allocate their after-tax budgets optimally when taxes have low
216
market salience.
Consider a taxpayer who needs to allocate her income between
purchasing a car and saving funds to pay for food and rent. If a nonmarket-salient car registration tax is levied after automobile
purchases, such that the taxpayer decides which car to purchase based
on the pretax price, the taxpayer may select a more expensive auto2 17
mobile than she would have desired if she understood the full cost.
After buying the expensive car and paying the non-market-salient tax,
the taxpayer may be left with too little funds remaining to cover her
expenses for food and rent.
Thus, the very feature that supports the simple normative case for
reducing market salience may also produce distortionary income effects. 218 To the extent that a car registration tax induces taxpayers to
purchase less expensive automobiles, this generates deadweight loss
through substitution effects. 2 19 Yet to the extent that reducing the
market salience of the car registration tax would return the taxpayers
to purchasing the more expensive automobiles, this may generate
deadweight loss through distortionary income effects. Completely
non-market-salient tax instruments can only mimic lump sum taxes in
producing no deadweight loss if taxpayers realize they have smaller
budgets due to the tax but then ignore the price effects of the tax
See Section III.A.
See, e.g., Chetty et al., note 6, at 1145.
216 See id. at 1145-46, 1175-76.
217 This example is adapted from Chetty et al., note 6, at 1174. The empirical assertion
that car registration taxes may have low market salience is supported by Richard Ott and
David Andrus' study of vehicle personal property taxes. See Ott & Andrus, note 30, at
137, 149-51.
218 See Chetty et al., note 6, at 1173-74.
219 The taxpayer would have derived greater utility from purchasing the more expensive
car in the absence of the tax, and the government receives less revenue from the taxpayer
purchasing the less expensive car (as compared to her purchasing the more expensive car).
214

215
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when allocating their smaller budgets. When low market-salience
taxes result both in lesser substitution effects and in distortionary income effects, the simple case for reducing market salience may no
220
longer hold.
Chetty, Looney, and Kroft model different ways in which individuals may allocate their budgets when faced with low market-salience
taxes. 221 They conclude that the welfare implications of reducing market salience depends critically on how taxpayers adjust their budgets. 222 If taxpayers fail to account for tax costs when allocating their
budgets, and purchase luxury items before necessities, the taxpayers
may end up being forced to primarily reduce consumption of necessities once they run out of funds. 223 In this case, the social welfare
losses caused by the distortionary income effects may overpower the
social welfare benefits from lessened substitution effects, thereby
22 4
making the net consequences of low market salience undesirable.
In contrast, if taxpayers respond to low market-salience taxes by primarily reducing their consumption of luxury goods, distortionary income effects can be avoided. This conclusion holds even when the
reason taxpayers primarily reduce consumption of luxury goods is
happenstance rather than the taxpayers rationally allocating their reduced after-tax budgets. If the taxpayers spend their funds first on
necessities, and only later on luxuries, the taxpayers may stumble into
a near-optimal budget allocation even when the taxpayers cannot accurately predict the size of their after-tax budgets. 22 5 Likewise, if taxpayers reduce their consumption of all goods equally, distortionary
226
income effects might create only small excess burden.
Consequently, distortionary income effects should only defeat the
simple case for reducing market salience when taxpayers purchase
luxury items before necessities and are thus forced to disproportionately cut their consumption of necessities once they run out of funds.
Cf. Chetty et al., note 6, at 1173-74.
Id.
See id. at 1174.
We use the term "necessities" here to indicate goods for which the taxpayers have
highly curved utility functions-those items the deprivation of which can cause a huge loss
in utility (for example, water)-and "luxuries" to refer to goods for which taxpayers have
less curved utility functions (for example, champagne). Distortionary income effects result
when taxpayers reduce consumption of goods for which their utility functions are more
curved, leading to a greater overall loss of utility. See id.
224 See id. The net social welfare implications of low market salience in this case, that is,
whether the negative implications of distortionary income effects in fact overpower the
positive implications of lessened substitution effects, is an empirical question. Of course,
one need not adopt a social welfare perspective to find such substitutions problematic, as
they would clearly impact a wide variety of theories of justice in distribution.
225 See id.
226 See id.
220
221
222
223
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In the following Subsection, we argue that this scenario is only likely
to occur under two limited sets of conditions: first, when low marketsalience taxes affect the irregular expenditures and activities of creditconstrained taxpayers, and, second, when there are long time delays
between market choices and tax assessments.
2.

The Limited Importance of DistortionaryIncome Effects

Our argument for the limited importance of distortionary income
effects depends on the nature of how taxpayers learn from experience.
For taxes imposed on regular expenditures or activities-in the absence of long time delays-we expect that taxpayers generally should
learn to approximate the size of their budgets through experience.
Even when taxpayers cannot accurately assess a tax instrument directly, taxpayers may still note the connections between tax-relevant
decisions and at least some of the tax consequences that follow from
those decisions.2 27 Through repeated exposure to the tax consequences of decisions, taxpayers may develop a rough sense of how
decisions affect their expected future tax liabilities, even without understanding the tax law mechanics of how these liabilities are
calculated.
Crucially, we expect that taxpayers find it much easier to learn from
experience that allocating one's pretax budget based on pretax prices
will produce budget shortfalls than to learn the precise mechanics of
how taxes cause these shortfalls. In a world with numerous taxes,
fees, and complex pricing by private-sector firms, the exact cause of
observed budget shortfalls may be difficult to determine. The effect
on a taxpayer's budget of each individual tax, fee, and pricing technique is bundled with the effects of all of the other taxes, fees, and
pricing techniques. 228 Therefore, when low market-salience taxes are
227 See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, The Theory of Taxation and Public Economics 144 (2008)
("Especially in the long run, it seems plausible that individuals would come to associate
certain levels of earnings or after-tax income with a given standard of living, so significant
earned-income illusion seems unlikely."); B. Douglas Bernheim, Taxation and Saving, in 3
Handbook of Public Economics 1173, 1201 (Alan J. Auerbach & Martin Feldstein eds.,
2002) (claiming that the view that unsophisticated individuals may learn to behave optimally "is particularly plausible when ... the activity in question is frequently repeated (so
that the individual has the opportunity to experiment and learn)"); Bar-Gill & Ferrari,
note 42, at 97 (noting that consumers adjust their conduct to correct for prior purchasing
mistakes). Contra Raj Chetty, Adam Looney & Kory Kroft, Salience and Taxation: Theory and Evidence 46-47 (NBER, Working Paper No. 13330, 2007), available at http://www.
nber.org/papers/w13330 (assessing the possibility of distortionary income effects without
taking into account the likelihood that most taxpayers will learn to approximate the size of
their budgets for regular expenditures and activities).
228 For a discussion of how bundled consequences from decisions can interfere with
learning from experience, see Liebman & Zeckhauser, note 20, at 4-5. See also Colin F.
Camerer, Comment on Noll and Krier, "Some Implications of Cognitive Psychology for
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assessed on regular expenditures and activities, we expect that taxpayers generally should learn to approximate the size of their budgets
229
well before they learn to estimate post-tax prices.
230
Assuming our analysis of taxpayer learning is mostly accurate,
reducing the market salience of taxation generally should have a much
greater impact through lessened substitution effects than through dis-

tortionary income effects. To the extent that taxpayers can roughly
estimate the size of their after-tax budgets, but partially ignore the

effects of taxation on relative prices, the simple normative case for
reducing market salience is robust to concerns about distortionary income effects.
a.

IrregularPurchasesby Credit-ConstrainedTaxpayers

The first set of conditions wherein we expect that distortionary income effects might still defeat the simple normative case for reducing
market salience occurs when taxes are assessed on irregular purchases
or activities by credit-constrained taxpayers. In the extreme case of
one-time purchases, taxpayers cannot learn from their own experience, as any learning will occur too late to be of use. Taxpayers may
still learn from the tax experiences of others, perhaps even employing

2 31
agents or third-party tools to help with estimating after-tax costs.
Yet this form of learning involves taxpayers estimating the impact of
discrete market decisions on their budgets, rather than just learning to

approximate the after-tax size of their budgets. Hence, for taxes on
irregular purchases and activities, learning facilitates taxpayers estimating both post-tax prices and after-tax budgets simultaneously.
We thus expect the simple case for reducing market salience to hold
more often for regular purchases and activities, as distortionary in-

come effects are mitigated by taxpayer learning. We do not expect
taxpayer learning to play an equivalent role with respect to irregular
Risk Regulation," 19 J. Legal Stud. 791, 794 (1990) (learning from experience is difficult
when feedback is unclear).
229 If the size of a low market-salience tax liability is made large enough, taxpayers eventually should learn to estimate the effects of the tax on both their budgets and on prices.
But short of the point where the size of the tax liability makes the tax completely market
salient, we expect learning to be more powerful with respect to budgets than with respect
to prices.
230 We are also assuming here that the learning process is not too long or expensive such
that relying on it triggers distributional concerns. We discuss distributional concerns in
Subsection III.C.2.
231 When making housing purchases, for instance, there are numerous financial calculators that can be used to estimate the total cost after all taxes and fees. E.g., Mortgage Tax
Deduction Calculator, Bankrate.com, http://www.bankrate.com/calculators/mortgages/
loan-tax-deduction-calculator.aspx; Monthly Cost of Buying a First Home, Homebuyingtips.net, http://www.homebuyingtips.net/CalculatorTotalMonthly.htm.
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purchases and activities. Taxpayers, however, may still be able to borrow or use prior savings to smooth their consumption over time,
thereby alleviating distortionary income effects even for irregular
purchases and activities. 232 Distortionary income effects occur when
taxpayers overspend on luxury goods and are thus forced to disproportionately cut consumption of more necessary goods. 233 But if the
taxpayers can smooth their consumption over time through borrowing
or using savings, the taxpayers can instead reduce their consumption
of future luxury goods, minimizing the need to reduce consumption of
234
necessities.

b.

Long Time Delays Between Market Choices and Tax Assessments

The second set of conditions wherein we expect that distortionary
income effects may defeat the simple case for reducing market salience operates much like the first. Long time delays between market
choices and tax assessments may interfere both with taxpayers learning about their after-tax budgets and with taxpayers smoothing their
consumption over time. If market salience is reduced by delaying tax
assessments for long time periods, taxpayers are likely to spend more
during the period prior to the tax assessment, leaving fewer resources
for spending after the tax assessment. A portion of this front-loaded
spending may represent lessened substitution effects to the extent taxpayers are discounting how the tax affects the relative prices of goods
and activities. Whether such front-loaded spending also represents
sizeable distortionary income effects depends on whether the
purchases during the early time period are more like luxuries or like
necessities as compared to purchases in the later time period.
In particular, if tax assessments with long time delays lead taxpayers
to save less than they otherwise would wish for retirement, then distortionary income effects may well overpower lessened substitution
effects. 235 We thus expect that the simple case for reducing market
salience may not hold with respect to long time delays.
See Chetty et al., note 6, at 1174.
See id. See also notes 221-26 and accompanying text for a discussion of the potential
welfare losses caused by low market-salience taxes.
234 See Chetty et al., note 6, at 1174. Of course, here too, there may well be a correlation between taxpayers who are credit-constrained and those who have difficulty in selfeducating, potentially raising distributional concerns. We discuss distributional issues explicitly in Subsection III.C.2.
235 Note that individuals seem ill-equipped for long-term decision-making like retirement planning even in the absence of low market-salience taxes. Bernheim, note 227, at
1201.
232

233
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C.

The Impact of Externalities and Distribution

Besides distortionary income effects, the most frequently discussed
limitations to the simple case for reducing market salience involve externalities or distribution.2 36 In this Section, we argue that the evaluation of both of these factors requires the consideration of offsetting
tax-rate adjustments. We expect that offsetting tax-rate adjustments
can alleviate most potential conflicts between the efficient revenueraising advantages of reducing market salience and concerns related
to externalities. In theory, we expect that offsetting tax-rate adjustments can also alleviate most conflicts between the efficient revenueraising advantages of reducing market salience and concerns related
to distribution, but we are uncertain of the extent to which the needed
offsetting tax-rate adjustments will be politically feasible in practice.
Regardless, even when offsetting tax-rate adjustments cannot fully alleviate concerns related to externalities or distribution, we still argue
that meaningful evaluation of the relationship between market salience and externalities or distribution requires an understanding of the
limitations of offsetting tax-rate adjustments.
Our argument in this Section is an extension of the "unifying conceptual framework for the normative study of taxation and related
237
subjects" developed in its most complete form by Louis Kaplow.
As Kaplow describes his proposed framework:
[I]n order to analyze a given policy ...the policy is combined
with a distributively offsetting adjustment to the income tax.
The net result is a reform package that is distribution neutral, which, as will be seen, holds much constant and leaves in
play the distinctive effects of the policy instrument under
consideration, ones that can then more readily be
evaluated. 238
As applied to the market salience of taxation, Kaplow's framework
suggests a mechanism for alleviating conflicts between the efficient
revenue-raising advantages implied by the simple normative case for
reducing market salience and competing concerns like externalities or
distribution. In many circumstances, offsetting tax-rate adjustments
236 See, e.g., Schenk, note 5, at 276 n.101 ("Low-salience taxes or provisions would be
counterproductive with respect to Pigouvian taxes that are intended to change behavior.");
Chetty et al., note 6, at 1170-76; Galle, note 14, at 61, 78, 100-03; Nussim, note 35, at 244-47,
249-53.
237 Kaplow, note 227, at xvii. Kaplow's framework builds on the seminal optimal tax
result in A.B. Atkinson & J.E. Stiglitz, The Design of Tax Structure: Direct Versus Indirect Taxation, 6 J. Pub. Econ. 55 (1976). Following typical practice, we hereinafter refer to
this latter result as "A-S 1976."
238 Kaplow, note 227, at xviii.
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suffice to counteract any negative consequences of reducing market
salience related to externalities or distribution, while preserving at
least some of the efficient revenue-raising advantages of reducing
market salience. Only when offsetting tax-rate adjustments cannot be
used to alleviate concerns related to externalities or distribution
should these concerns be viewed as limitations to the simple case for
reducing market salience.2 39 The following paragraphs develop this
argument first with respect to externalities and then with respect to
distribution.
1.

Externalities

When market decisions produce externalities-costs or benefits to
parties other than those making the market decisions-social welfare
generally can be enhanced by imposing taxes equal to negative externalities or subsidies equal to positive externalities.

240

The goal is to

cause market decision makers to internalize the social costs or benefits of their decisions. 241 In the case of Pigouvian taxes (that is, taxes
imposed for the purpose of correcting negative externalities), the externality correcting features of the tax depend on market decision
makers' understanding the price implications of the tax. In the absence of tax-rate adjustments, making a Pigouvian tax less market sali242
ent would undermine the externality correcting potential of the tax.
With offsetting tax-rate adjustments, however, it often should be
possible to preserve both the externality correcting advantages of the

Pigouvian tax and the efficient revenue-raising advantages of reducing
market salience. For example, imagine that a tax on pollution can be
made less market salient such that polluters would perceive only onehalf of the cost of the tax. 243 In this example, making the appropriate
tax-rate adjustments would require doubling the rates of the pollution
239 Cf. Kaplow, note 227, at 148 (arguing that results based on models that do not consider the possibility of offsetting tax-rate adjustments "are often highly misleading").
240 See, e.g., Helmuth Cremer, Firouz Gahvari & Norbert Ladoux, Externalities and Optimal Taxation, 70 J. Pub. Econ. 343, 344 (1998); Alan J. Auerbach & James R. Hines, Jr.,
Taxation and Economic Efficiency 51-57 (NBER, Working Paper No. 8181, 2001), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w8181.pdf; Louis Kaplow, Optimal Control of Externalities in the Presence of Income Taxation 1-2 (NBER, Working Paper No. 12339, 2006),
available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w12339.pdf.
241 David S. Gamage, Taxing Political Donations: The Case for Corrective Taxes in
Campaign Finance, 113 Yale L.J. 1283, 1294 (2004).
242 See Nussim, note 35, at 249-50; Schenk, note 8, at 276 n.101.
243 The example here assumes that the taxpayers (that is, the polluters) perceive only
half of the cost of the tax with respect to all of their market decisions. If a tax could be
made more market salient with respect to the choice to pollute, without affecting the market salience of the tax with respect to any other market decisions, then increasing the
market salience of the tax might improve social welfare.
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tax. For simplicity, assume that the extra revenue generated by doubling the rates of the pollution tax would be used to fund reductions in
other (non-Pigouvian) taxes. With the tax rates increased to offset the
reduction in market salience, the tax can be set to optimally correct
for externalities while generating revenue in a manner that minimizes
excess burden (as the less distortionary low market-salience tax replaces other more distortionary taxes). All that is needed in this example is to gross up the rates of the Pigouvian tax to offset for the
244
reduction in the market salience of the tax instrument.
Of course, it will not always be possible to adjust the rates of
Pigouvian taxes so as to completely correct for externalities while preserving the full efficient revenue-raising potential of low-market-salience. Some tax instruments may be less market salient with respect to
the decisions producing negative externalities than with respect to
other market decisions. And political or administrative constraints
may sometimes prevent the rates of Pigouvian taxes from being raised
beyond a certain level. 2 45 In these circumstances, it may still be necessary to trade off between the externality-correcting advantages of
keeping a Pigouvian tax fully market salient and the efficient revenueraising advantages of reducing the market salience of the tax.
Nevertheless, the first analytic step should still be to consider offsetting tax-rate adjustments. 246 We expect that in most circumstances
offsetting tax-rate adjustments should be capable of at least partially
alleviating conflicts between the goals of externality correction and of
244 The optimal setting of a low market-salience Pigouvian tax is somewhat more complicated than this example would suggest, as the efficient revenue-raising advantages of

reducing market salience may support increasing the tax above the optimal level for controlling externalities. Nevertheless, the example should suffice to demonstrate how offset-

ting tax-rate adjustments can alleviate conflicts between the goals of minimizing
externalities and of generating revenue efficiently by exploiting low market-salience.
245But see David A. Weisbach, Should Legal Rules Be Used to Redistribute Income?,
70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 439, 451-52 (2003) (critiquing the idea that political and/or administra-

tive constraints tend to prevent modifications to the tax system).
246 There are many possible interactions between market salience and externalities beyond those we address here. For instance, under Chetty, Looney, and Kroft's boundedrationality model for market salience, increasing the rate of a tax is assumed to make the
tax more market salient. See Chetty et al., note 227, at 28-35. If externalities were added
to this model, the optimal tax rate sometimes might fall below the level that fully corrects

for externalities, as raising the tax rate above the optimal point could eliminate more social
welfare benefits from efficient revenue-raising than it would create from preventing
externalities.
The simple case for reducing market salience can still be preserved, however, even
within a Chetty-Looney-Kroft-style model with externalities, to the extent there exists

other more market salient tax instruments that can also be used to correct for externalities.
The optimal tax mix would then require reducing the market salience of the original
Pigouvian tax instrument, while increasing the use of secondary (fully market salient)
Pigouvian tax instruments in order to correct for the externalities.
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efficient revenue-raising through exploiting low market salience. 247
To the extent offsetting tax-rate adjustments can be made, the simple
normative case for reducing market salience should apply even for
Pigouvian taxes. Often, all that will be needed is to gross up the rates
of the Pigouvian tax so as to offset any reduction to its market
2 48
salience.

2.

Distribution

As with externalities, meaningful evaluation of the interactions between market salience and distribution must consider the potential for
offsetting tax-rate adjustments. Evaluating the impact of distributional concerns, however, involves additional complexities. Notably,
distributional analysis requires understanding how market salience affects tax incidence. We do not address the tax incidence question in
this Article. 2 49 In our view, the existing empirical literature on market
salience is not yet sufficiently developed to allow for even grounded
speculation about the distributional impact of market salience. Instead, we argue that with offsetting tax-rate adjustments, the simple
normative case for reducing market salience may hold even when reducing market salience would have negative distributional implications in the absence of offsetting tax-rate adjustments.
247 For further qualifications to Kaplow's framework that may also apply to our discussion of market salience and externalities, see, e.g., Kaplow, note 227, at 135-48. Although a
full discussion of how the qualifications to Kaplow's framework apply in the context of
market salience and externalities is beyond the scope of this Article, we believe that
Kaplow's general assessment of the importance of the major qualifications should generally hold: "[M]ost of the qualifications, although they may require important adjustments
in particular settings,... do not systematically favor moving away [from the central conclusions of the framework] ....Instead, the optimal adjustments tend to be more subtle and
context specific. They can readily be in either direction ....
" Id. at 136.
248 Conversely, when market decisions produce positive externalities, such that subsidization may be in order, the subsidies generally should be made as market salient as possible (with the amount of the subsidy adjusted as appropriate). Of course, in either case,
adjusting the levels of Pigouvian taxes or subsidies to account for salience requires some
ability to estimate the extent to which a tax has high or low market salience. But being
able to (at least roughly) estimate the magnitude of salience effects is necessary to account
for salience under any approach. Consider an exception that proves our general point: If
polluters would remain completely unaware of a Pigouvian tax regardless of any amount of
gross-up, then grossing up the tax would not cause the polluters to fully internalize their
pollution externalities. However, in this (implausible) case, the government could essentially raise its entire budget from taxing these polluters without affecting their behavior.
We thus expect that grossing up the amount of a tax will suffice to counteract low market
salience in nearly all real world scenarios.
249 For existing discussions of market salience and tax incidence, see Chetty et al., note
6, at 1167-69; Galle, note 14, at 100-03; Nussim, note 35, at 244-47.

Imaged with the permission of Tax Law Review of New York University School of Law

2011]

THREE ESSAYS ON TAX SALIENCE

If reducing the market salience of a tax instrument would have neg-

ative distributional implications, 250 these distributional implications
may be at least partially offset by adjusting the rates of the income tax
or of other available tax instruments. The reason is that the income
tax typically will be better at measuring characteristics relevant for
251

distribution.
As a starting point, imagine that taxpayers' ability to earn income is
the only characteristic of taxpayers that is relevant for distributional
analysis. 252 Further imagine that the income tax near perfectly measures taxpayers' ability to earn income, with the sole limitation being

that taxpayers may substitute from work to leisure as a result of the
income tax reducing the returns to work as opposed to leisure. 253 Finally, assume that-controlling for taxpayers' income-any heteroge-

neity in taxpayers' susceptibility to means for reducing market
salience is uncorrelated with the taxpayers' preferences for leisure as
254
opposed to work.

250 Typically, a tax policy change is thought to have negative distributional implications
when it reduces the progressivity of the tax system by shifting the tax burden from wealthier taxpayers to less wealthy taxpayers.
251 See Kaplow, note 227, at 21.
252 The description of the starting point in this paragraph is intended as a simplified
articulation of Kaplow's framework.
253 Welfare-enhancing redistribution then entails transferring resources from high-ability
taxpayers to low-ability taxpayers, except for the limitation that such redistribution may
lead high-ability taxpayers to work less (to mimic the observable behavior of low-ability
taxpayers). This tradeoff is the intuition behind Okun's "leaky bucket"-the essential
tradeoff between redistribution and efficiency that underlies much of optimal tax theory.
See Joel Slemrod, Fixing the Leak in Okun's Bucket: Optimal Tax Progressivity When
Avoidance Can Be Controlled, 55 J. Pub. Econ. 41, 41-42 (1994).
Note that the assumption that the income tax "near perfectly measures taxpayers' ability" is meant to imply the absence of administrative or compliance costs or of any other
distortionary responses to the income tax other than labor-to-leisure substitutions. One of
us (Gamage) has an early-stage working paper arguing that Kaplow's framework should be
expanded to incorporate a wider range of distortionary responses, and that expanding the
framework in this fashion implies that the income tax probably should not be the sole tax
instrument used for redistribution. David Gamage, Toward a Theory for the Optimal Tax
Mix (unpublished manuscript on file with the Tax Law Review). This argument potentially
implies that, even with offsetting tax-rate adjustments, the simple normative case for reducing market salience is not completely robust to distributional concerns.
254 This relates to the famous "separability" assumption of Kaplow's framework (and of
the A-S 1976 model and related literature); however, our formulation is purposefully colloquial rather than formal. For discussions of the consequences of relaxing this assumption,
see Louis Kaplow, Taxing Leisure Complements, 48 Econ. Inquiry 1065, 1065-66 (2010);
Emmanuel Saez, The Desirability of Commodity Taxation Under Non-Linear Income Taxation and Heterogeneous Tastes, 83 J. Pub. Econ. 217, 217-18, 228-29 (2002); Jeff Strnad,
The Progressivity Puzzle: The Key Role of Personal Attributes 1-4, 22-28 (Stanford Law
Sch. John M. Olin Program in Law and Econ., Working Paper No. 293, 2004), available at
http://papers.ssrn.comlsol3/paper.cfm?abstract id=10289.
Chris Sanchirico has strongly critiqued the use of the separability assumption in
Kaplow's framework and in other optimal taxation literature. Chris William Sanchirico,
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Under these assumptions, any concerns related to distribution can
be completely alleviated through offsetting income tax-rate adjustments, such that the simple case for reducing market salience is robust
to distributional concerns. Reducing the market salience of any tax
instrument for which such income tax-rate adjustment is possible alleviates labor-to-leisure distortions, which are the only costs to redistribution under these assumptions. Hence, reducing market salience
lowers the costs of enacting redistribution. With offsetting income
tax-rate adjustments, reducing market salience can thus achieve

greater redistribution at lower efficiency costs.
Consider a brief and stylized example. Suppose that a state makes
its sales tax less market salient. Further suppose that this reform improves the efficiency of the state's tax system, by reducing substitution
effects, but that the reform leads to poorer taxpayers shouldering a
greater portion of the tax burden and wealthier taxpayers a reduced
burden. Without offsetting tax-rate adjustments, the negative distributional consequences of the reform might overpower the positive efficiency gains. By combining the reform with offsetting tax-rate
adjustments-for example, reducing the income tax rates facing
poorer taxpayers, and raising the rates facing wealthier taxpayersthe state can improve the welfare of all taxpayers.
There are numerous qualifications to this strong result, which depends on the narrow assumptions noted above. 255 Perhaps most imTax Eclecticism, 64 Tax L. Rev. 149, 149-55 (2011). Yet Sanchirico's argument only implies
that relaxing the separability assumption requires adjustments to the results obtained in
models based on separability assumptions. Although this conclusion is undoubtedly correct, Sanchirico's critique does not suggest the direction in which these adjustments should
be made. For instance, in relation to the question of the desirability of capital income
taxation, Sanchirico's argument does not suggest whether capital income should be taxed
or subsidized. See id. at 226 ("By combining either the positive taxation or the subsidy of a
given attribute with a calibrated uniform lump sum transfer, a taxable attribute may be
used to effect a multilateral zero-sum transfer among taxpayers. One of the two compensated transfers so constructed-either from a positive tax or from a subsidy-will effect
socially positive redistribution."). Notably, although the two authors' tones are quite different, the implications of Sanchirico's argument mirror Kaplow's conclusions. Kaplow,
note 227, at 135-36. Both authors recognize that the results obtained from models based
on separability assumptions may need to be adjusted in some fashion once those assumptions are relaxed, but both authors conclude that the directions in which these adjustments
should be made are ambiguous without further analysis. Like Kaplow, id., we view these
conclusions as supporting the consideration of offsetting tax-rate adjustments as an essential first step. Numerous qualifications to the basic framework may limit the potential for
offsetting tax-rate adjustments, thus making distributional concerns a (possible) partial
limiting factor to the simple normative case for reducing market salience. But analyses of
the relationship between market salience and distribution that do not consider the potential of offsetting tax-rate adjustments are likely to produce erroneous results.
255For discussions of qualifications to the strong result from Kaplow's framework-as
explained in a simplified form above-see, e.g., Kaplow, note 227, at 135-48; Christine
Jolls, Behavioral Economic Analysis of Redistributive Legal Rules, 51 Vand. L. Rev. 1653,
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portantly, if a technique for reducing market salience does not affect
all taxpayers equally, there may be correlations between a taxpayer's
susceptibility to the technique for reducing market salience and characteristics of the taxpayer that are relevant for distributional analysis
(that cannot be perfectly controlled for by the income tax). As an
example of such a confounding correlation, heterogeneity in taxpayers' general cognitive ability could be associated with both taxpayers'
ability to earn income-controlling for the actual income earnedand with taxpayers' susceptibility to the means for reducing market
salience.2 56 If so, reducing market salience would increase the revenues raised from lower-ability taxpayers more than from higher-ability taxpayers. 257 The income-tax-rate adjustments required to offset
these negative distributional consequences of reducing market salience might then counteract only some of the efficient revenue-raising
258
advantages of reducing market salience.
Furthermore, as with our discussion of externalities, even when offsetting tax-rate adjustments are theoretically capable of resolving distributional concerns, political or administrative limitations may
prevent the implementation of the offsetting tax-rate adjustments. In
particular, if the rates of the income tax are set based on voters' or
politicians' aesthetic judgments, such that these judgments are not updated when the distributional impact of other parts of the tax system
1658-73 (1998); Richard S. Markovits, Why Kaplow and Shavell's "Double Distortion Argument" Articles are Wrong, 13 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 511, 550-55 (2005); Chris William
Sanchirico, Deconstructing the New Efficiency Rationale, 86 Cornell L. Rev. 1003, 1031-48
(2001).
Jolls' discussion is particularly noteworthy in the context of this Article. See Jolts, supra,
at 1658-73. Jolts argues that behavioral factors may lead taxpayers to respond differently
to redistribution enacted through the tax system than to redistribution enacted through
other legal rules. Id. In essence, her argument suggests that the price effects of redistribution enacted through legal rules may be less market salient on at least some margins than
the price effects of redistribution enacted through the income tax. See id. at 1676-77. This
argument can be extended to apply to redistribution enacted by manipulating the market
salience of tax instruments as compared to redistribution enacted by adjusting the rates of
other fully market-salient tax instruments. Although this qualification is intellectually intriguing, we agree with Jolls that the practical importance of this qualification can only be
determined through further empirical work. Id. at 1677.
256 For instance, susceptibility to market salience might be correlated with taxpayers'
"willpower." See generally Lee Anne Fennell, Willpower Taxes, 99 Geo. L.J. 1371, 1371
(2011) (discussing "effects of existing and proposed tax policy measures on people with
different self-control levels").
257 Both Galle and Nussim discuss the relationship between general cognitive ability and
the distributional implications of market salience. Both authors also discuss the potentially
countervailing factor of the relationship between the opportunity cost of taxpayers' time
and the distributional impact of market salience. Galle, note 14, at 100-04; Nussim, note
35, at 244-47.
258 This is equivalent to "tagging" in the wrong direction. Kyle Logue & Joel Slemrod,
Genes as Tags: The Tax Implications of Widely Available Genetic Information, 61 Nat'l
Tax J. 843, 848-49 (2008).
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are changed, then this "isolation effect" in the judgments made by
voters or politicians may interfere with the enactment of the appropri259
ate offsetting tax-rate adjustments.
Despite these qualifications, we continue to expect that offsetting
tax-rate adjustments should often suffice to (at least partially) alleviate distributional concerns. Our primary doubt in this regard is
whether the offsetting tax-rate adjustments needed to alleviate distributional concerns will prove politically feasible. We hope to analyze
this question further in future research. For now, although we doubt
that offsetting tax-rate adjustments will always prove politically feasible, we see no reason for concluding that politics will always (or even
generally) prevent the implementation of offsetting tax-rate adjustments. Ultimately, meaningfully evaluating concerns related to distribution requires some understanding of the potential for and limits to
offsetting tax-rate adjustments.
In any case, the magnitude of distributional concerns is primarily an
empirical question. The existing empirical literature does not provide
cause for thinking there are strong negative distributional implications
to reducing market salience, 260 and most of the existing discussions of
market salience and distribution do not evaluate the potential for offsetting tax-rate adjustments to alleviate these concerns. We cannot
rule out the possibility of future empirical research demonstrating
strong distributional concerns that cannot be alleviated through offsetting tax-rate adjustments. But in the absence of such findings, we
expect that, with offsetting tax-rate adjustments, the simple normative
case for reducing market salience generally should be robust to concerns related to both externalities and distribution.
D.

Analyzing the Normative Implications of Market
Salience-Conclusion

We conclude that in most circumstances it is desirable to reduce the
market salience of taxation. First, we expect that the benefits of lessened substitution effects should generally overwhelm the harm from
distortionary income effects. Second, with offsetting tax-rate adjustments, the simple case for reducing market salience should also be
generally robust to concerns related to externalities and distribution.
Overall then, we consider the case for reducing market salience to be
strong. Future research will undoubtedly continue to develop limita259 See McCaffery & Baron, note 76, at 300-01 (reporting empirical results that suggest
the existence of this form of "isolation effects"). But see Kaplow, note 227, at 32 (arguing
that "as a matter of political reality, there is some gross plausibility" to using an analytic
framework based on offsetting tax-rate adjustments).
260 See Galle, note 14, at 100; Schenk, note 5, at 295-96.
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tions to this case. In some circumstances these limitations may overpower the advantages from reducing market salience. Nevertheless,
we argue that scholars should advocate a general presumption in favor
of reducing market salience.

IV.

ANALYZING

THE NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS OF

POLITICAL SALIENCE

In this Part, our third essay, we dispute the commonly espoused
notion that it is wrong for governments to reduce the political salience
of taxation. We do not claim that it is desirable to reduce political
salience. We argue instead that scholars lack any basis for evaluating
whether manipulating political salience in either direction is good or

bad. Numerous political commentators argue against tax reforms that
are alleged to reduce political salience, even when the commentators
agree that the reforms would otherwise improve the efficiency of taxa-

tion.261 These arguments sometimes are made by liberals and moderates as well as by conservatives. 262 We conclude that these
commentators are in error. Contrary to standard beliefs, democratic
values provide no support for rejecting tax reforms because the re2 63
forms might reduce political salience.
It is revealing to contrast the normative analysis of political salience

with the normative analysis of market salience. We can evaluate the
normative implications of market salience because economic theory
provides a meaningful baseline for conducting this analysis. 264 By defining full market salience to be when taxpayers perceive the dollar
costs imposed by tax prices equivalently to the dollar costs charged by
private-sector vendors, we can generate a theoretical benchmark that
gives meaning to notions of "high" and "low" market salience. 2 65
261 See, e.g., notes 3, 80, 97, and accompanying text (citing to a number of strong political positions advocated for based on the political salience hypotheses discussed in Section
I.S).
262 Rosanne Altshuler & Jacob Goldin, The Opacity of Marginal Tax Rates, 125 Tax
Notes 335, 335 (Oct. 19, 2009) (arguing that tax policy should be discussed using effective
rates because "statutory and effective rates differ so haphazardly that most taxpayers
would probably not be able to identify how much tax they owe on an additional dollar of
income"); Galle, note 14, at 60-63 (arguing that unnoticed taxes are more efficient because
they do not change a taxpayer's behavior); McCaffery, note 56, at 1943 ("1 must confess, as
the above comments no doubt indicate, to being uneasy at the prospect of exploiting cognitive error as a general approach, even though I count myself a liberal.").
263 Our argument in this Part is in many ways similar to Schenk's. See Schenk, note 5, at
287-90. We mostly composed this Article before Schenk's writing was made publically
available; hence, although we cite to Schenk's work in a number of instances, we do not
fully evaluate her contributions.
264 See notes 209-12 and accompanying text.
265

Id.
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Most of the normative writings on political salience assume that a
similar baseline can be used to evaluate the normative implications of
political salience. For political decision-making, however, we lack a
reference point equivalent to the market prices charged by privatesector vendors. Our current understanding of voter psychology and of
political philosophy are insufficient to provide us with a useful baseline that can be applied to the real-world fiscal policy debates for
which political salience is relevant. Lacking a useful baseline, we cannot ascertain the normative implications of raising or lowering political salience. We simply do not know enough about how voters reach
political judgments (or how they ought to do so) for us to say anything
meaningful about the normative implications of political salience with
respect to real-world fiscal policy debates.
Nevertheless, our argument has limits. We would oppose the government sneaking money out of taxpayers' wallets in the middle of the
night. We would also oppose a government brainwashing its citizens
so that they ignored tax costs. In short, we would oppose secret forms
266
of taxation.
But secret taxes are the stuff of academic musings and of libertarians' nightmares; there are no secret taxes in the real world of fiscal
policy. 267 The instruments critiqued as being "hidden taxes" (as having low political salience) do not present the same concerns as would
truly secret taxes. It might well be, for instance, that VATs and corporate income taxes are less politically salient than individual income
taxes. 268 But in no sense are these tax instruments truly secret. Any
American desiring to learn about the corporate income tax is free to
do so. Indeed, both governmental and nongovernmental actors provide a wealth of statistical information to assist in evaluating the corporate income tax and other tax instruments alleged to have low
269
political salience.
Arguably, the administration of individual income taxes results in
more taxpayers confronting these taxes directly. Because the individual income tax is pushed more in the face of a typical taxpayer, it is
thought to have higher political salience. 270 But shoving a tax instru266 We develop this distinction further in Section IV.C, drawing in particular on
Schenk's discussion of the differences between salience and transparency. See Schenk,
note 5, at 256-64.
267 See Lohman & Weiss, note 3, at 584-86; Schenk, note 8, at 262-63.
268 See Subsection lI.I.1.
269 E.g. SOI Tax Stats-Corporation Tax Statistics, http://www.irs.gov/taxstats/bustaxstats/article/0,,id=97145,00.html (last updated May 12, 2011); Kevin A. Hassett & Aparna
Mathur, Am. Enter. Inst. for Pub. Pol'y Research, Report Card on Effective Corporate Tax
Rates: United States Gets an F, Tax Pol'y Outlook, Feb. 2011, at 1, available at http://www.
aei.org/docLib/TPO-2011-01-g.pdf.
270 See Subsection II.B.1.
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ment in taxpayers' faces is not necessarily desirable. Just as we would
oppose extreme forms of secret taxes, we would also oppose extreme
forms of forced-attention taxes.
Even if we think it desirable for voters to pay attention to their tax
burdens, how much attention is sufficient? Do we want voters to get
one large bill every year aggregating their liabilities under all forms of
taxation? Even if they did, we might worry that voters would not take
sufficient note of this aggregate tax figure. Should we then go further
and require voters to spend several hours a day reciting their tax liability figures as a form of mantra? Or perhaps we should demand that
voters calculate at the end of each work day how much of that day's
earnings are remitted to the government in combined tax payments?
To enforce these measures, would we need tax-salience police to randomly surprise voters with pop quizzes, jailing those voters who fail to
study their tax burdens with sufficient care?
These examples are purposefully silly. 271 But they highlight the

point that, unless we somehow cause voters to ponder their tax liabilities for every minute of every day, any tax instrument can be considered to have low political salience as compared to some hypothetical
alternative .272

Of course, the converse of this point is that any tax instrument
might also be considered to have too high political salience as compared to a different hypothetical alternative. Just as there is always a
hypothetical tax instrument with higher political salience than any existing tax instrument, there will also always be a hypothetical tax instrument with lower political salience as compared to any existing tax
instruments. And just as we might worry about biases to voting resulting from too little political salience, we might also worry about biases
resulting from too much political salience. After all, private-sector
businesses hardly make their customers sing a daily mantra about the
cost of the services they provide. Nor are voters required to recite
mantras about the benefits they receive from public spending. Furthermore, because the current system itself is of a given political salience, there is unavoidable circularity in trying to assess the political
salience of a tax system based on current voter perceptions of that tax
system.
Hence, in contrast to market salience, we lack a baseline for full or
neutral political salience. We might be able to compare two tax in271 But see, e.g., John Kass, Yes We Can: Surefire Plan to End Bickering over Taxes,
Chi. Trib., Apr. 18, 2010, § 2, at 2 (proposing abolishing withholding and holding elections
immediately after income taxes are due).
272 Furthermore, at some point we do not know how to achieve maximum salience anyway since it is likely that a daily tax mantra would just recede in importance as routine
because voters have many concerns besides their taxes.
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struments and conclude that one has higher political salience than the
other. But outside of hypothetical extremes like secret taxes or
forced-attention taxes, we cannot say in the abstract whether any specific tax instrument has high or low political salience. Without a useful
baseline for neutral political salience, we cannot evaluate whether the
political salience of any real-world tax instrument is too high or too
low.
Stated differently, we might think it generally laudable to provide
voters with as much information as possible relevant to political decision-making. But it should be noncontroversial that providing such
information is only desirable when the information is accurate. Democratic values do not support offering voters false or arbitrary information about their tax burdens. The essence of our argument in this
Part is that attempts to increase the political salience of taxation are
akin to providing voters with false or arbitrary information about their
tax burdens.
Apart from the hypothetical extremes of secret taxes or forced-attention taxes, we lack grounds for determining whether increasing or
decreasing political salience would provide voters with more accurate
information. With respect to the real-world tax policy debates for
which political salience is relevant, we simply cannot say whether
democratic values would be furthered by using tax instruments with
higher or lower political salience.
Before developing our arguments in this Part further, we should repeat some of the caveats to our analysis that we previously explained
with respect to market salience. 273 First, some mechanisms for
manipulating political salience may clearly have harmful or beneficial
effects. We consider only the end of reducing political salience, not
potential means for achieving that end. Second, we evaluate only the
consequences of manipulating political salience. Although we do not
believe that there is anything inherently problematic about manipulating political salience apart from consequences, we leave consideration
of that question for future research. Finally, we do not mean to imply
that governments actually can manipulate political salience with any
likelihood of success. Our arguments in this Part are entirely theoretical. Even if future research provides mechanisms that are clearly capable of manipulating political salience, we argue that our current
theoretical understanding is insufficient for determining whether governments should employ those mechanisms. And of more immediate
importance, we argue against those who oppose existing tax reforms
that could improve the efficiency of taxation on the grounds that these
reforms might reduce political salience.
273

See Section III.D.
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The Lack of a Useful Normative Baseline for Measuring
Political Salience

In evaluating potential baselines for political salience, we begin with
the traditional assumption that democratic institutions should be
structured so as to effectuate the voters' collective will, and political
information should thus be assessed based on how well it enables vot2 74
ers to make political judgments based on their "true" preferences.
This notion of a political-salience baseline is attractive not only as a
matter of political theory, but also seems to provide the underpinnings
for most existing normative discussions of political salience. 275 There
are, however, devastating problems in proceeding with any normative
argument based on such a notion of a baseline determined by voters'
"true" preferences. In their current states of development, neither the
fields of psychology nor philosophy can provide a useful baseline for
276
evaluating political salience.
Beginning with psychology, as to the presentation to voters of questions related to taxation, it turns out that how researchers ask questions of voters can dramatically affect the answers received.2 77 And
we have no means for assessing the correct manner in which questions
should be asked. For example, in experiments conducted by McCaffery and Baron, the experimental subjects expressed significantly different preferences regarding fiscal policies depending on whether tax
prices were expressed in dollar values or as percentages. 278 In particular, subjects tended to prefer more progressive tax structures when the
tax system was represented in percentage terms rather than using dollar values. 279 This evidence suggests that voters often support tax-rate
progressivity without having a strong sense about what progressivity
means or about how much progressivity they favor. 28 0 Under the
standard definitions, a "flat tax" is defined as when all taxpayers pay
274

Geoffrey Brennan & Loren Lomasky, Democracy and Decision: The Pure Theory of

Electoral Preference 202 (1993).

In this Section, we provide some reasons to be wary of the very notion of stable voter
preferences with regard to public finance. Nevertheless, our purpose in discussing "voter
preferences" is to explicitly argue from within the conventional framework that there are
such preferences and that we should strive to honor them. See id. ("It is difficult to see
how concern with the nature of electoral process could arise in a context where citizens'
preferences were taken to carry no normative weight.").
275 See id.
276 See McCaffery & Baron, note 74, at 107.
277 See id. at 108 (citing Irwin Levin, Sandra Schneider & Gary Gaeth, All Frames Are
Not Created Equal: A Typology and Critical Analysis of Framing Effects, 76 Org. Behav.

& Hum. Decision Processes 149, 150 (1998); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Rational
Choice and the Framing of Decisions, 59 J. Bus. S251, S253 (1986)).
278

Id. at 113-14.

279

Id.

280

See id.
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the same percentage of their incomes in taxation, and a "progressive
tax" as when higher-income taxpayers pay a greater percentage of
their incomes in taxation than do lower-income taxpayers. 281 But,
when tax liabilities are displayed in dollar values, rather than as percentages, higher-income taxpayers are shown as paying more tax dollars than lower-income taxpayers even under a flat tax.2 2 It perhaps
should come as no surprise then that displaying tax information in
dollar values appears to dramatically reduce voters' support for
28 3
progressivity.
It is not clear whether voters' "true" preferences are better reflected by the opinions voters express when shown percentage-based
tax information or when shown dollar-value-based information. 28 4 Indeed, we might infer from the experimental evidence on voters' tax
preferences that voters frequently make aesthetic judgments about
taxation based on superficial characteristics of tax systems. 285 One
might even question whether it is useful to think of voters as having
28 6
"true" preferences.
Furthermore, there is no particular reason to expect political competition to alleviate voter confusion rather than to exacerbate it. A
single vote is almost never decisive, and individual voters thus face
little incentive to work through difficult concepts like taxation rather
than just voting based on their passions and surface-level understand-

ings.287 As McCaffery and Baron argue:
Arbitrage against heuristics and biases is a private good in
private markets, but a public good in public markets. The

private actor, noticing an anomaly in private markets, can
profit from her insight: The invisible hand of competition
works to effect marginal cost pricing, for example. In the

public sphere, in contrast, an actor who notices an inefficient
281 Inst. on Tax'n & Econ. Pol'y, Guide to Fair State and Local Taxes 1-2 (2011), available at http://www.itepnet.org/pdf/guide.pdf.
282 See id. at 2-3.

283 See McCaffery & Baron, note 74, at 114.
284 Lawrence Zelenak, The Conscientious Legislator and Public Opinion on Taxes, 40
Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 369, 374 (2009) ("It is far from clear that either frame-dollars or percentages-is more revealing of true preferences than the other."); see also Epstein, note 6,
at 358-59 (discussing whether absolute tax liability or percentage of total liability is more
relevant to determining true preference).
285 See Edward McCaffery & Jonathan Baron, The Political Psychology of Redistribution, 52 UCLA L. Rev. 1745, 1749 (2005) ("We argue that public finance systems have a
psychological dimension, such that ordinary citizens will react inconsistently based on a
system's appearance.").
286 See, e.g., Bryan Caplan, The Myth of the Rational Voter: Why Democracies Choose
Bad Policies 2 (2007) ("The central idea is that voters are worse than ignorant; they are, in
a word, irrational-andvote accordingly.").
287 Brennan & Lomasky, note 274, at 36-37.
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tax or spending program-a violation of the first prong of
the optimal welfare-economics analysis-cannot thereby
capture any gains for herself or even her party. Public goods
2
are predictably undersupplied. 88
Our initial problem in determining a baseline for the political salience of taxation is, thus, that voter preferences appear to be unstable
and easily manipulated. Our next-and related-challenge is that

survey after survey confirms the commonsense intuition that voters
have only the most attenuated sense of how our current fiscal system
2 89
works or about their preferences for how the system ought to work.
Absent a future revolution in the study of voter psychology, examina-

tion of voters' expressed preferences is unlikely to yield a useful baseline for political salience. We simply cannot trust voters to tell us what
they want with sufficient precision to illuminate the real-world fiscal
policy debates for which political salience is relevant.
Moreover, turning to philosophical inquiry, the research demonstrating that voters are deeply confused about taxation only begins to

illustrate a more fundamental problem. There is reason to be skeptical of the very notion that tax-burden measurements provide meaningful information for making political judgments, thus implying that
most of the tax-burden information that can be made available to voters is fundamentally flawed. 290 According to a powerful argument
most associated with Liam Murphy and Thomas Nagel, when voters
directly assess their tax burdens they elevate artificial measurements
291
for pretax resources.
288 McCaffery & Baron, note 285, at 1788-89.
289 E.g., Larry M. Bartels, Homer Gets a Tax Cut: Inequality and Public Policy in the
American Mind, 3 Persp. on Pol. 15, 26 (2005) ("Other observers, while a bit more circumspect about stipulating what people would do if they knew what was good for them, have
still managed to raise significant doubts about the capacity of the American public to reason effectively about tax policy,"); Steven M. Sheffrin, What Does the Public Believe
About Tax Fairness?, 46 Nat'l Tax J. 301, 306 (1993).
290 It is important to note that political salience is not necessarily about voters' perceptions of their own tax burdens. Tax instruments with low political salience may function by
reducing voters' perceptions of their own tax burdens at the time of political decisionmaking. But they might also function by reducing voters' perceptions of the tax burdens
borne by other taxpayers whom the voters' find sympathetic. In other words, nothing in
this discussion should be taken as implying that voters care only about their own tax burdens when making political decisions. The political salience of a tax instrument matters
regardless of whose tax burdens voters are concerned with.
291 Murphy and Nagel have made this argument most forcefully in recent years, but the
argument has a long pedigree. See Liam Murphy & Thomas Nagel, The Myth of Ownership: Taxes and Justice 31-37 (2002). For instance, Michael Graetz made essentially the
same argument in 1995. See Michael Graetz, Paint-By-Numbers Tax Lawmaking, 95
Colum. L. Rev. 609, 619 (1995) ("The most interesting questions-the overall effects of
government action ... on the distribution of income-are impossible to evaluate, even in
principle. This is because the point for comparison, namely, the distribution of income
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For instance, within the context of the current U.S. federal income
tax, a voter's income-tax liability is defined by first calculating the
voter's pretax gross income. 29 2 The calculated amount for pretax income is merely an artificial accounting concept. Yet the manner in
which income taxes are structured makes it seem as though pretax
gross income measurements have independent meaning outside of tax
accounting. In what they label as "everyday libertarianism," Murphy
and Nagel contend that voters frequently come to believe that they
have some entitlement rights to their pretax income measurements
(for example, gross income) and that the tax liabilities calculated from
these measurements indicate how much the voter is personally sacrificing in order to fund state spending programs.2 9 3 Yet, as the economist Carl Shoup explained decades ago,
To say, for example, that households with before-tax incomes
between $2,000 and $5,000 pay 12 percent of that income in
taxes, directly and indirectly, is to make a statement without
significance because it is conceptually invalid. It is conceptually invalid because it postulates, for implicit comparison, a
state of affairs in which there are no taxes whatever, and no
government borrowing or creation of new money, hence implicitly no government services, not even the minimum type
and amount necessary to assure the existence of the
294
society.
Shoup viewed this objection as "conclusive, '29 5 and we agree.
Crucially, any amounts calculated as gross income-or as other
pretax resource measurements-are dependent on the existence of
government in its current form. In order for a pretax income measurement to have moral weight independent of the existing structure
of government, the measurement would need to be based on something independent of the operation of state spending programs. The
amount a taxpayer calculates as her gross income is highly unlikely to
be exactly equivalent to the amount of gross income she would have
received in any hypothetical state of nature. Were it possible to subtract from pretax income the amount by which a taxpayer's income is
higher due to the effects of government expenditures, then this net
absent any government, is unknowable, indeed unimaginable."). Graetz attributed this
argument to an earlier public finance treatise by Carl Shoup. Id. (quoting Carl S. Shoup,
Public Finance 577-78 (1969)).
292 See IRC § 61.
293 Murphy & Nagel, note 291, at 31-37.
294 Shoup, note 291, at 577-78.
295

Id.
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measurement arguably might have moral relevance. But for existing
measurements of pretax resources, we cannot easily divorce the extent
to which pretax resources are higher due to the operation of state
spending programs from the amount of pretax resources that would
still be enjoyed in the absence of state-funded spending programs.
By acknowledging the power of their argument, we do not mean to
endorse all of the conclusions that Murphy and Nagel reach based on
their critique of pretax income measurements. Murphy and Nagel
suggest that the government's contribution to pretax resource measurements should be considered in relation to a minimal version of the
state of nature-such as that associated with Hobbes. 96 Without
state spending programs, like the police and military, they argue, there
would be little income or wealth as life would be nasty, brutish, and
short. 297 Hence, for Murphy and Nagel, almost the entirety of pretax
income measurements should be viewed as dependent on the opera29
tion of state spending programs.
A more sophisticated libertarian (in contrast to an "everyday libertarian")299 could reasonably argue that the appropriate baseline for
fiscal policy is more "Lockean" than "Hobbesian," and therefore that
governments should largely defer to the distributive (and allocative)
outcomes of voluntary market exchanges. 300 Libertarian-minded voters might further specify that the appropriate baseline should be measured based on a minimalist night-watchman state. 30 1 Under this
libertarian view, the morally relevant pretax income measurement
might be the amount of pretax income one would have had if we lived
in an actual night-watchman state. Any taxes taken from the nightwatchman pretax income measurement could then be considered sacrifices the taxpayer is making (or is forced to make) in order to fund
additional state spending programs.
296

Murphy & Nagel, note 291, at 16-17.

297

Id.

Id.
Perhaps the most famous example of such a libertarian is Robert Nozick, who claims,
with little qualification, that "[t]axation of earnings from labor is on par with forced labor."
Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia 169 (1974); see also Richard Epstein, Taxation
in a Lockean World, 4 Soc. Phil. & Pol'y, no. 1, 1986, at 49.
300 See Kevin A. Kordana & David H. Tabachnick, Tax and the Philosopher's Stone, 89
Va. L. Rev. 647, 651 (2003) (book review) ("It seems to us that a proponent of the view
that market outcomes have prima facie moral weight (e.g., a Lockean liberal) might agree
with Murphy and Nagel that one's ultimate entitlements are a post-institutional matter.
The Lockean liberal would, however, have quite a different view of the appropriate content of the distributive scheme. Presumably, the Lockean liberal holds that the institutional distributive scheme should, in some measure, mirror the outcomes of consensual
economic transactions by respecting the prima facie weight of natural rights in property.").
301 See Richard A. Epstein, The Ubiquity of the Benefit Principle, 67 S.Cal. L. Rev.
1369, 1406 (1994) ("Improvements from the state of nature become vested as a matter of
private right: They establish a new baseline against which further action is measured.").
298
299
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Hence, although a sophisticated libertarian must acknowledge that
the details of any existing pretax income measurements are not sacrosanct, 30 2 she could still insist that these numbers have some general
normative significance. We acknowledge the abstract plausibility of
such a position and agree that pretax income measurements arguably
might provide some information about the amounts taxpayers contribute to fund government spending. Yet where does this insight get us
in terms of practical tax policy?
Without a political system to define and protect property, it is hard
to decide just which pretax property has moral weight. 30 3 Arguably, if
we wish to protect property within a modern capitalist framework, we
30 4
might need a state that looks an awful lot like the status quo.
There is considerable evidence that governments in more economically free countries tend to be bigger, not smaller-not only must such
governments provide public services that are clearly related to property protection (for example, police and courts), but wealthy governments invest in public goods that make existing wealth possible (for
example, roads, water supply) and spur still more (for example,

302 Of course, libertarians can and do criticize taxation. Libertarians can also justifiably
preach that others should resist the government "taking your money." But even within a
libertarian conception of justice, it would be mistaken to claim that tax liabilities calculated
based on existing pretax resource measurements are an accurate reflection of how much of
"your money" the government is taking in taxes. Even a libertarian should recognize that
the amounts taxpayers calculate for their pretax incomes within the current system of taxes
and government spending depend partially on the existence of government spending.
Were taxes and spending lower, pretax income measurements would be different. See
David G. Duff, Private Property and Tax Policy in a Libertarian World: A Critical Review,
18 Can. J. of L. & Jurisprudence 23, 32-34 (2005) (noting that libertarian theories of taxation do not even indicate an appropriate tax base); Epstein, note 299, at 66-68 (conceding
that following Locke does not help us choose between an income or consumption base and
that the current Code is full of unjustifiable tax expenditures); Barbara H. Fried, The Puzzling Case for Proportionate Taxation, 2 Chap. L. Rev. 157, 191-95 (1999) (arguing, among
other things, that the libertarian commitment to proportionate taxation is strategic and not
principled and that libertarianism is more consistent with a regressive tax system).
303 See Stephen Holmes & Cass R. Sunstein, The Cost of Rights 63-64 (1999) (discussing
how even a hands-off state must spend to protect private property). A famous example
from Nozick involves our right to pay to see Wilt Chamberlain and Chamberlain's right to
be paid more than anyone else as a result. Nozick, note 299, at 160-64. Yet Nozick does
not explain that the whole reason Chamberlain can command this income is surely thanks
not only to our desires, but to our joint production of a world in which there is professional
basketball-hardly the kind of thing popular in the state of nature. See generally Barbara
Fried, Wilt Chamberlain Revisited: Nozick's "Justice in Transfer" and the Problem of Market-Based Distribution, 24 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 226 (1995).
304 Cf. Barbara H. Fried, "If You Don't Like It, Leave It": The Problem of Exit in
Social Contractarian Arguments, 31 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 40, 45 (2003) (noting in particular
that classic libertarian arguments tends to make libertarians "apologists for the status
quo").
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schools). 30 5 There is even a libertarian argument for some level of
30 6
redistribution by the government.
For the purposes of this Article, we take no position on these debates. Our argument does not rely on any particular version of libertarianism or other political philosophy being more correct. To the
contrary, our general point applies to all approaches to political philosophy that we know of, and our point is that no such philosophy is
fine-grained enough to provide guidance as to real-world questions
about political salience. 30 7 Put broadly, if one has a well-developed
conception of the nature of a just fiscal state, it might theoretically be
possible to create a measurement for how much more (or less) a citizen is paying in taxes (or receiving in state-funded benefits) within the

existing state than she would have in the just state. With such a measurement in hand, one could then evaluate proposals for increasing or
decreasing the political salience of taxation. Any proposal that shifted

voters' understandings of tax costs toward the measurement deemed
appropriate by the governing theory of distributive justice could be
judged desirable, and any proposal that shifted voters' understandings
away from that baseline could be considered undesirable.
305 See Douglass C. North, John Joseph Wallis & Barry R. Weingast, Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History 10-12
(observing that relatively wealthy "open access" governments are characterized by relatively large governments (particularly at the subnational level)).
306 Eric Mack, Non-Absolute Rights and Libertarian Taxation 23 Soc. Phil. & Pol'y 109,
109 (2006) (arguing how a libertarian can justify a minimal safety net for individuals).
307 For instance, our argument applies with equal force to thinkers associated with deliberative democracy. See, e.g., Joshua Cohen, Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy, in
Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics 72 (James Bohman & William
Rehg eds., 1997) ("The notion of a deliberative democracy is rooted in the intuitive ideal of
a democratic association in which the justification of the terms and conditions of association proceeds through public argument and reasoning among equal citizens."). In emphasizing that democratic decisions must be the product of a legitimate process, and a process
that would involve consulting with experts, such theorists problematize the search for a
simple stable baseline as to what the "people" want. See id. at 73; Josiah Ober, Democracy
and Knowledge: Innovation and Learning in Classical Athens 118-67 (2008) (describing
institutional processes by which democratic Athens "aggregated" the knowledge, including
expert knowledge, of its citizens). And so, following these thinkers, what is desired by the
people of a democracy is what the people have arrived at through a democratic process,
not polling about bare preferences. That democratic process involves considering possibly
complex tradeoffs, like, for example, between more political salience and other values,
such as efficiency, fairness, federalism, and the like. Cf. Jurgen Habermas, Between Facts
and Norms 362 (William Rehg trans. 1996) ("Political opinion polls provide a certain reflection of 'public opinion' only if they have been preceded by a focused public debate and
a corresponding opinion-formation in a mobilized public sphere."); James S. Fishkin, The
Voice of the People 142-43, 169 (1995) ("In the mass society we have created there are...
incentives for rational ignorance and for citizens to report, in opinion polls, a surface impression of sound bites and headlines .... Institutions that speak for the people need to be
both representative and deliberative."). Thus, theories of deliberative democracy do not
offer us an off-the-rack baseline for political salience either; all such theories (quite reasonably) demand is that we engage in appropriate practices to determine the baseline.
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Yet without a meticulously well-developed conception of the nature
of a just fiscal state, one cannot determine a useful baseline for evaluating political salience. The differences between the baselines implied
by more Hobbesian-style theories and more Lockean-style theories
dwarf the variation in political salience likely to result from any realworld fiscal policy choices. Even if we could agree on a specific political philosophy, for instance libertarianism, different variations of that
philosophy might yield dramatically different normative baselines.
And even if we could further agree on a particular variation of a specific political philosophy, we would still need to determine what resources individuals would enjoy within the relevant version of the
state of nature and then measure the differences between these hypothetical resource measurements and real-world pretax incomes. In
short, the task is impossible.
We think it manifestly obvious that American voters do not share a
well-developed conception of the nature of a just fiscal state. But
without such a shared conception, we cannot ascertain whether the
political salience of any existing tax system is "too high" or "too low."
That is, assuming we could even determine how a tax-design technique would impact political salience, the normative implications of
altering political salience would be completely different depending on
whether one adopted a more Hobbesian view of political justice or a
more Lockean view. And even if political philosophers could somehow convince the electorate to agree upon a particular notion of the
just fiscal state, none of the existing notions advanced by philosophers
are sufficiently developed to generate a useful baseline for political
salience.
Put slightly differently, any policy proposal that increases or decreases political salience must alter either pretax income measurements or how taxpayers understand pretax income measurements. To
determine whether this is normatively desirable or problematic, we
must know whether the policy proposal improves or detracts from the
meaningful information provided by the pretax income measurements, and any sort of metric for this information is what is elusive.
Suppose, for example, that it could be proven that introducing a VAT
would reduce voters' assessments of tax costs; how are we to know
whether this would move voters closer or further away from their true
preferences as to taxation (or even their true preference as to the political salience of taxation)?
Lacking a rigorous answer for what information voters should use
to assess the costs of taxation, we cannot develop a useful normative
baseline for measuring voter preferences, a precondition for evaluating political salience. The empirical evidence on voter psychology
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suggests that voters' preferences with regard to the (problematic) information about taxation that can be made available are shallow and
unstable. Social science has not developed a commonly accepted theory for how voters want to understand tax information. And there is
no philosophical approach to taxation that we know of that is finegrained enough to provide a baseline for policymakers to use when
considering political salience. Consequently, we simply do not know
enough about the nature of voters' true preferences to ascertain
whether the political salience of any real-world tax system is too high
or too low.
B.

Comparing the Political Salience of Taxation to that
of Public Spending

Even if we could somehow answer the question of what information
voters should use when politically assessing the costs imposed by taxation, this information alone would not solve the analytic challenge of
arriving at a baseline for political salience. We would still need to
know the political salience of government expenditures-the extent to
which voters accurately understand the benefits produced by government spending. 30 8 If voters could be made to accurately understand
the costs of government, but not the benefits, we would still lack a
baseline capable of honoring voters' true fiscal preferences.
So far, our discussion has primarily focused on the problem of understanding voters' preferences with regard to the distributional aspects of fiscal policy. Yet if we could somehow abstract from
distributional questions, we might attempt to evaluate only the allocative dimension of political salience. 30 9 For example, imagine a simplified model of politics in which all taxpayers are identical, thus
ignoring any redistributive effects of taxes and of government spending. Within this model, we might imagine taxpayers voting on tax issues based on elementary cost-benefit analyses wherein the benefits of
public spending are compared against the tax costs required to fund
the spending. Under this model, if the government used price-shrouding techniques to reduce the political salience of taxation, voters might
underweight tax costs as compared to the benefits of public spending
and thus vote for "too much" government spending.
This implausibly simplified model of politics appears to be what
many of the scholars who criticize the use of tax instruments with low
See Cullis & Jones, note 68, at 219.
3o9 See Richard A. Musgrave, The Theory of Public Finance: A Study in Public Economy 5 (1959) (distinguishing between allocative and distributional dimensions of fiscal
policy).
308
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political salience have in
Yet even within this overly simplified model, the argument that taxes should be made as politically sali-

ent as possible falls apart once we begin questioning how salient the
benefits produced by public spending are. The use of tax instruments
with low political salience can only be said to distort voters' cost-benefit analyses if we know that the benefits of public spending have
higher political salience. To facilitate voters' cost-benefit analyses, we
should strive to make the costs of taxation and the benefits of public
spending equally politically salient.
Just as there are reasons to think that existing tax instruments might
cause voters to sometimes underestimate their tax burdens, there are
also reasons to think that existing fiscal policies might cause voters to
sometimes underestimate the benefits of public spending. 31 ' There is

no analytical reason to expect that the forces that might lead voters to
underestimate their tax burdens generally overpower the forces that
312
might cause voters to underestimate the benefits of public spending.

Voters simply do not start with a baseline of complete information
about either the benefits of public sector spending or about the impact

of taxes. Tax instruments with lower political salience can only be said
to distort voter preferences if these preferences would have been un-

distorted in the absence of such tax instruments.
Consider the indirect taxes political salience hypothesis. 313 Like the

costs of taxation, the benefits of government spending are often indirect. 314 A prime example is the whole class of benefits that are provided in order to remedy what are perceived as market failures. In a

society where the primary decisions as to resource allocation are left
to the market, the role of the government generally recedes to the

background-for instance, deterring crime, regulating the food and
water supply, and providing national defense. For many government
310 See, e.g., Cabral & Hoxby, note 18, at 10-13 (advancing a similar model with the
addition that the government uses its agenda-setting power to increase its size); Anthony
Downs, Why the Government Budget Is Too Small in a Democracy, 12 World Pol. 541, 559
(1960) ("Thus, insofar as taxation can be concealed from the electorate, the government
budget will tend to be larger than the 'correct' one.").
311 Cullis & Jones, note 68, at 220 (discussing arguments made by Anthony Downs and
John Kenneth Galbraith).
312 The comparison made here is intended to be completely hypothetical. Although we
do find many of the political salience hypotheses persuasive, we see no reason for concluding that voters underestimate the aggregate costs of taxation. It seems equally likely that
voters overestimate these costs. We are similarly agnostic about whether voters underestimate or overestimate the aggregate benefits produced by government spending.
313 See Subsection II.B.1.
314 And, by design, because governments often specifically provide those services that
cannot be provided through a standard market mechanism. See Downs, note 310, at 54759 ("I believe the actual budget will still be smaller than the 'correct' budget because even
indirect taxation is much more apparent than many remote government benefits.").
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services, a taxpayer often may only focus on the services when the
3 15
government has failed.
Consider next our second political salience hypothesis of tax-system
complexity. 31 6 One argument we discussed for how existing tax systems can be made complex noted that tax systems may be composed
of multiple smaller tax instruments instead of a single aggregate tax
instrument. 317 Yet government spending programs are also frequently
disaggregated. If disaggregation obscures the costs of taxation, then it
is hard to see why it should not similarly obfuscate the benefits pro31 8
duced by government spending.
Without reviewing how all of the political salience hypotheses might
apply to the benefits of public spending, the general theme should be
clear. There is neither empirical nor theoretical support for the claim
that the benefits of public spending are more salient than are the costs
of taxation. 319 Indeed, we suspect that those theorists who argue that
governments generally strive to reduce the political salience of taxa315 For instance, we are likely to remain ignorant of the specialist regional agency that
may be responsible for our water or public transportation until something has gone wrong.
316 See Subsection II.B.2.

317 See notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
318 In commenting critically on the proposal that the government send tax bills out to
taxpayers (a change that, intuitively, would lessen political salience), Grover Norquist essentially made the same point: "On my Visa bill, I get a list of all the things that I got with
my money in addition to what I paid. We don't tend to get that from the government at
any level." Norquist, note 3, at 121. The reformist response is that maybe tax bills could
include benefits, but to the extent they cannot (certainly with the same level of precision),
then this suggests that voters are undercounting governmental benefits relative to private
ones.
319 See Cullis & Jones, note 68, at 226. And this is even assuming that the notion of
"government spending" is well understood. The dominant thinking among economists is
that the public sector has a footprint the size of its intervention in the market economy.
See, e.g., Marc Labonte, The Size and Role of Government: Economic Issues, Congressional Research Service, June 14, 2010, at 13, 26 available at http://digital.library.unt.edu/
ark:/67531/metadc26213/ml/1/high-res-d/RL32162_2009Jul01.pdf ("Most economists
judge the economic merit of any government program based on its effect on economic
efficiency.... In sum, there is not an economic rationale for either "big" or "small" government, per se. It is not so much the size of government as what government does with its
spending, transfer, tax, and regulatory policies that affects economic efficiency and
growth."); Gruber, note 72, at 18-20 (introductory public finance textbook warning students not to overlook the regulatory role of government); Shaviro, note 66, at 30 ("[A]
more promising approach than seeking any such measure is to evaluate the size of government on particular dimensions, one at a time."). This sophisticated approach is not necessarily consistent with typical political rhetoric, which is likely to focus on crude measures,
like the size of the government budget relative to GDP. Furthermore, there are good
reasons for one's intuitions here to be confused. As Olson recognized, the most "traditional," and often least controversial, government functions are done via some form of
coercion. Thus a government that sticks to so-called traditional roles (such as police), eschewing intervention in the market whenever possible (say through entering the market
itself), will likely operate on citizens by means of coercion more often and this may well
make the government seem larger. Olson, note 78, at 95-96.
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tion to the extent possible have at least partially misunderstood the
nature of government. 320 It is questionable whether any individual
politician benefits when the political salience of taxation is reduced.
Although politicians as a class might benefit if reducing political salience expands the politicians' joint scope for action, collective action
problems may nevertheless prevent individual politicians from acting
in the interests of this common pool. As John Cullis and Philip Jones
conclude, "if circumstances were such that political agents sought to
minimize resistance by engineering a situation of equal visibility
across taxes, they have apparently failed. '321
For instance, although the U.S. federal government has instituted
withholding for federal payroll and income taxes, the government still
requires an annual filing that necessitates an annual encounter with
the ever more forbidding Internal Revenue Code. Proposals for making annual filing potentially less politically salient have received little
support from the political establishment, even when there are strong
arguments for these proposals on administrative efficiency grounds. 322
Other important tax instruments are implemented without withholding, such as the taxation of most dividends and capital gains, not to
mention property taxes. Strikingly, to the extent that property taxes
are sometimes subject to a kind of withholding, it is the choice of
many taxpayers to use this technique, one offered by the private sector. 323 Any lessening of political salience resulting from this innovation seems to be the responsibility of taxpayers themselves, not the
government.
And this raises a further confounding issue; if voters compare the
benefits of tax-funded government spending to the benefits of privately-funded market consumption, then the use of price shrouding
techniques by private-sector firms is also relevant for constructing a
baseline for political salience. 324 Tax instruments with low political
salience should only lead voters to prefer government-provided services to market-provided services when the tax prices are more
320 Jean-Baptiste Colbert is often quoted as having said: "Taxation is the art of plucking
the goose so as to obtain the largest amount of feathers with the smallest amount of hissing." Salanid, note 197, at 157 n.105 (2003). A sizeable branch of the political economy
literature has taken this notion as one of its basic postulates. See, e.g., Walter Hettich &
Stanley Winer, Democratic Choice and Taxation: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis
(1999).
321 Cullis & Jones, note 68, at 226.
322 See generally Joseph Bankman, Simple Filing for Average Citizens: The California
ReadyReturn, 107 Tax Notes 1431 (June 13, 2005) (discussing California's pilot program
where the state prepared a tentative return for certain taxpayers); Zelenak, note 83, at 5356 (discussing the pay-as-you-earn system and a tax agency reconciliation system where the
agency creates a tentative return for the taxpayer, who then reviews the return).
323 See Cabral & Hoxby, note 18, at 3, 16 (discussing tax escrow accounts).
324 See, e.g., Kim & Kachersky, note 29, at 139-40.
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shrouded than are the prices of the private-sector consumption. And
whereas collective action problems may obviate individual politicians'
incentives to reduce political salience, private-sector actors do not
face equivalent obstacles. Unlike governments, private-sector businesses generally can be expected to reduce the salience of the prices
they charge to the extent that doing so increases profits.
In sum, the existing literature does not provide grounds for concluding whether the costs of taxation or the benefits of public spending are
more politically salient. 32 5 Assuming that voter preferences ought to
be respected, our initial problem in assessing the political salience of
taxation is that voter preferences appear to be unstable, easily
manipulated, and analytically ambiguous. This problem is then amplified when confused voter preferences on government spending are
taken into account.

C.

Analyzing the Normative Implications of Political

Salience-Conclusion
How are democratic institutions to function in the face of such
widespread voter confusion and ignorance? What does it mean to be
respectful of voter preferences when voters' fiscal beliefs appear to
lack any strong foundations? These are difficult questions. Our purpose is to draw attention to these questions and to discuss their implications, rather than to answer them. Nevertheless, and even in the
absence of sound empirical or analytic evidence, numerous scholars
and political commentators appear to believe that existing fiscal institutions bias voter preferences in the direction of favoring larger levels
for taxation and government spending. 326 It is with this notion that we
take issue.
We do not mean to advocate fiscal nihilism. Democracy requires
that voters assess tax policies. We reiterate our opposition to secret
forms of taxation. A government should not be permitted to brainwash its citizens so that they forget about the existence of taxes. More
realistically, we would also oppose reducing the political salience of
taxation to the point where voters seemed to clearly underestimate
tax costs. Noteworthy on this point is Deborah Schenk's distinction
between reducing political salience (in her words "exploiting the sali325 See, e.g., Cullis & Jones, note 68, at 226 ("There is, on this evidence, no clear-cut
support for the dominance of overall optimistic or pessimistic tax illusions. The general
lack of knowledge supports only the argument that rational voters will not invest time and
effort in the accumulation of information ....").
326 See, e.g., Schenk, note 5, at 290-94 (discussing scholars and commentators who express this belief); see also our survey of different political salience theories in Section II.B.
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ence bias") and reducing "transparency. '327 For Schenk, transparency
refers to a feature of the political process, namely that the process is
sufficiently open for voters to be able to learn how tax decisions are
made so as to hold politicians accountable for the resulting tax polinot preclude
cies. 328 Schenk argues that the goal of transparency does
329
the use of tax instruments with low political salience.
A particularly intriguing argument made by Schenk is that voters
may sometimes want taxes to be collected in a less politically salient
way so as not to confuse or aggravate themselves because they also
want the services that taxes fund. 330 This argument is generally consistent with the observation that voters seem to want both more
spending and less taxes,331 and it is also (arguably) normatively appealing because it gives voters credit for a kind of self-debiasing. That
is, voters may know that when it comes to taxes they do not want to
know. 332 This is also perhaps a curious implication of the Cabral and
Hoxby study on property tax withholding. 333 The primary form of
property tax withholding studied by Cabral and Hoxby was provided
by the private sector, and thus chosen by the voters through their market decisions, rather than imposed on the voters by governments. We
might thus speculatively infer that these voters desired property tax
withholding to control their known irrational aversion to property
taxation.

334

Nevertheless, at the extreme, choosing a tax instrument only because of its lower political salience could, at least eventually, undermine the related value of political transparency. Just as we oppose
secret taxes, we think a plausible argument can be made against reducing the political salience of a tax instrument to the point of threatening transparency.

327 Schenk, note 5, at 256-63.
328 Id. at 260.
329 Id. at 256-60, 285.
330 Id. at 289.

331 There is evidence that the hypothesis that voters have inconsistent preferences for
lower taxes and higher spending has a fair amount of explanatory power. See generally
Colin H. McCubbins & Mathew D. McCubbins, Proposition 13 and the California Fiscal
Shell Game 4 (U.S.C. CLEO Research paper No. C10-16, 2009), available at http://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1548024.
332 Schenk, note 5, at 272, 289.
333 See Cabral & Hoxby, note 18.
334 Note that Cabral and Hoxby do not seem to challenge the traditional economic argument in favor of property taxes and also cite survey evidence that taxpayers are particularly happy with spending on local public goods despite particular unhappiness with the
property tax, thus further suggesting that the use of property tax escrows is a kind of voluntary self-commitment device. See id. at 13, 19-20.

Imaged with the permission of Tax Law Review of New York University School of Law

2011]

THREE ESSAYS ON TAX SALIENCE

Yet these precepts offer little guidance with respect to the realworld tax policy debates for which political salience is relevant. 33 5 For
instance, even if it could be proven that introducing a VAT would reduce voters' assessments of tax costs, how are we to know whether
this would move voters closer or further away from how they would
ideally like to perceive the political costs of taxation were they free of
cognitive biases and limitations? We are unaware of any argument for
why financing government through a VAT would threaten Schenk's
concept of transparency. Or, even if we knew that abolishing the alternative minimum tax-and raising income tax rates to offset the revenue loss-would increase political salience, how can we determine
whether this would shift the overall political salience of the tax system
in the right or the wrong direction?
It might someday be possible to answer these questions. But existing arguments for increasing the political salience of taxation have
failed to do so. Instead, the existing arguments rely on a naive and
unexamined notion of a baseline wherein voters are assumed to fully
understand fiscal policies with the sole exception being when tax design reduces political salience. As we have argued, this notion of a
baseline for political salience is fatally flawed.
We finish by restating the central argument of this Part. 336 The con-

ventional wisdom on political salience criticizes any reforms that
335 And, as to these real-world tax policy debates, there is much to be said in terms of
efficiency and equity and other standard criteria of tax analysis. At least to some extent,
our arguments on political salience imply that we should focus our debates over real-world
tax policy on considerations for which analytical rigor is possible (like efficiency) and eschew shadow boxing as to considerations for which meaningful debate is not (yet?) possible (for example, political salience).
336 To reiterate one of our initial caveats, our discussion in this Part has proceeded on
consequentialist grounds. We have analyzed the implications of manipulating political salience with respect to the impact of doing so on voter decision-making. Our use of this
mode of analysis is no accident. The scholars who argue for increasing the political salience of taxation base their arguments on similar consequentialist grounds. Our goal has
been to demonstrate the hollowness of existing arguments against reducing political salience, and our discussion has thus followed the approach underlying these arguments.
Alternatively, it might be possible to analyze the normative implications of manipulating
political salience on nonconsequentialist grounds. Even if we cannot say whether the political salience of existing tax instruments is too high or too low, might we nevertheless criticize attempts to purposefully manipulate political salience? Is there anything wrong with
consciously designing tax instruments so as to induce voters to favor one's preferred policy
outcomes?
For the most part, we leave these questions for future research. We note, however, that
any nonconsequentialist critique of purposefully manipulating political salience should
consider devices likes tax expenditure budgets and deficit measurements-devices purposefully designed to manipulate political salience, but advocated for on the grounds of
improving voter decision-making. A developed nonconsequentialist account may need to
distinguish between attempts to manipulate political salience with the aim of inducing voters to support more controversial political objectives (such as one's preferences about the
size of government) and those aimed at furthering more generally agreed upon objectives
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might reduce political salience because such reforms are thought to
frustrate voter preferences as to taxation and to the size and nature of
government. We conclude that this conventional wisdom rests on analytic feet of clay. In contrast to market salience, we lack a baseline for
determining full or neutral political salience. Lacking such a baseline,
we simply cannot evaluate whether the political salience of any realworld tax instruments is too high or too low.

V.

CONCLUSION

Our primary objective in these essays has been to facilitate better
discussions of tax salience. We began by analyzing the empirical literature on both market salience and political salience. We concluded
that these literatures are tentative and that they do not support the
strong claims frequently made about tax salience with regard to realworld policy debates. We continued by evaluating the normative implications of market salience, arguing that it is generally desirable to
lessen market salience to the extent possible. Contrary to the conclusions of much of the recent literature, we determined that the benefits
of reducing market salience should usually overpower concerns related to distortionary income effects, externalities, and distribution.
Finally, we assessed the normative implications of political salience.
Disputing the conventional wisdom, we explained that democratic values provide no support for increasing political salience.
The late twentieth century saw the triumph of neoclassical optimal
tax theory.337 In addition to becoming the dominant mode of analysis
by tax scholars in economics departments and in elite law schools, this
neoclassical approach profoundly influenced tax reforms in the U.S.
and in other nations. 338 We hope that the early twenty-first century
will similarly bring the triumph of behavioral public finance through
the study of tax salience.
The need is great, as improving policymakers' understandings of tax
salience may be our best hope for preventing the looming U.S. fiscal
apocalypse. 339 Because we believe the current path of unsustainable
budget deficits is at least partially due to tax salience, 340 it would be
particularly appropriate if deeper insight into tax salience helped
usher in a new period of more reasonable fiscal policy.
(such as counteracting politicians' arguably perverse incentives to overuse tax expenditures
or deficit financing).
337 See, e.g., Edward McCaffery & James R. Hines, Jr., The Last Best Hope for Progressivity in Tax, 83 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1031, 1037 (2010).
338 See id.
339 See, e.g., notes 9-10 and accompanying text; Schenk, note 5, at 297-310.
340 See Subsection II.B.4.
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